



Anonymous Oxonian *Dubitaciones* on Aristotle's *De sensu et sensato* (Prague, Metropolitan Chapter, Ms. M. 80, ff. 131vb-132vb)*

Monika MANSFELD**

ABSTRACT

The incomplete commentary on Aristotle's *De sensu et sensato* found in Prague, Metropolitan Chapter, Ms. M. 80, ff. 131vb-132vb was composed around 1250 in Oxford. Its author, whose identity is yet to be discovered, drew heavily on the so-called Oxford Gloss and Robert Grosseteste. It must have been originally designed for teaching purposes, presumably at the Faculty of Arts. Its peculiar form — *dubitaciones* — indicate a divergence from literal explanations of source texts, leading to a more independent formulation of research problems. For this reason, it emerges as an intermediary form between expositions and question-commentaries. These *dubitaciones* are divided into two thematically distinct blocks beginning with short lemmas. First seven of them deal with the relationship between an organism viewed as a psychophysical unity and its various operations, such as sensations and emotions. The other block contains five short *dubitaciones* on animal senses and a longer one on whether celestial bodies have colour. This neat composition is, however, interrupted by an independent note regarding the order of the powers of the soul following the first *dubitatio* in the second block.

KEYWORDS

medieval Aristotelianism; natural philosophy; *De sensu et sensato*; Aristotle; University of Oxford

* This paper is a result of research financed from the grant of the Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange (NAWA), Bekker's Programme: *The Theory of Sensual Perception in the 13th Century Oxford* (PPN/BEK/2019/1/00011).

** Ph.D., assistant professor, Institute of Philosophy, University of Łódź. E-mail: monika.mansfeld@uni.lodz.pl.

The Prague manuscript M. 80 has recently attracted considerable research interest: it has been intensively studied to determine its time and place of origin, as well as its contents.¹ According to Rega Wood, the publisher of its detailed codicological description, it is a composite codex consisting of six parts, dated between ca. 1245 and 1275.² Its specific script (*Anglicana/Incipient Anglicana*) and the presence of works by English masters associated with Oxford university, such as Adam of Whitby and Richard Rufus of Cornwall, indicate that it was written in England, most likely at Oxford.³ It contains works almost exclusively devoted to natural philosophy: commentaries on Aristotle (for example, *De generatione et corruptione*, *Meteora*, *De anima*, and *Parva naturalia*), Pseudo-Aristotle (e.g. *De plantis* and *De casu et fortuna*), and independent treatises (e.g. *De motu circulari elementorum* and *De unitate mundi*). Several of them have been attributed to particular authors, but the majority remain anonymous.

The information about the commentary on the *De sensu et sensato* preserved on ff. 131vb–132vb in Ms. M. 80 is relatively limited. It belongs to the manuscript's fourth part (which covers ff. 109–146) together with anonymous commentaries on *De somno et vigilia*, *De longitudine et breuitate vitae*, *De coelo* (Anonymus Antissiodorensis), a somewhat enigmatic treatise called *De habitaculo humano* which may be a commentary on Pseudo-Aristotelian *De mundo*, and as many as three commentaries on the *De generatione et corruptione* (Wood, 2022). They are all written in *Incipient Anglicana* and dated to about 1270 (Wood, 2022). Reading this part of the manuscript is difficult, because the codex was bound in an erratic way, breaking up text written on different quires (leaves?); some catchwords at the bottom of pages ending a quire match the following folio (as is the case of f. 124v), but some others do not (for instance, f. 116v) (Wood, 2022). The Commentary on *De sensu et sensato* is a victim of this practice, since it breaks down in the middle of a sentence around one thirteenth of the way through Aristotle's work. If it were complete, it would have constituted a large commentary. The fragment at our disposal, however small it may appear, is nevertheless far from insignificant.

The commentary consists of a series of short discursive pieces called *dubitaciones*, which are an intermediary form between literal expositions and

¹ I would like to express gratitude to Prof. Marek Gensler for correcting the English of this paper and to Maciej Stanek Ph.D. for his editorial suggestions.

² Wood suggests that it was probably originally bound by Dominicans at Oxford but soon taken to Bohemia, since it is known to have been at the Prague Castle for centuries (Wood, 2022).

³ Wood, 2022. Moreover, Sten Ebbesen found a passage on f. 82ra: “Quod autem non insunt [sc. passiones] animae per se, hoc videtur Aristoteles velle in hac lectione” (Ebbesen, 2020: 21) which seems to indicate that the manuscript was a product of teaching at the Faculty of Arts in Oxford.

questions. They are divided into two thematically distinct blocks beginning with short lemmas. First seven dubitationes deal with the relationship between an organism viewed as a psychophysical unity and its various operations, such as sensations and emotions. The other block contains four short dubitationes on animal senses and a longer one on whether celestial bodies have colour. They run as follows:

Quoniam autem de anima (436a1).

1. Utrum sensus, memoria, ira, desiderium, appetitus et gaudium sint operationes communes corpori et animae?
2. An sensus sit communis coniuncto ex corpore et anima?
3. Utrum memoria sit operatio coniuncti ex corpore et anima?
4. Utrum ira et desiderium sint operationes coniuncti ex corpore et anima?
5. Utrum gaudium et tristitia sint operationes coniuncti ex corpore et anima?
6. Utrum somnus et vigilia insint omnibus animalibus?
7. Utrum appetitus solum inest animalibus?

Sed de sensu et sentire (436b8).

1. Utrum sensus ita se habeat ad animal quod ipso posito ponitur animal et ipso destructo destruitur?
2. Utrum tactus et gustus insint omni animali?
3. Utrum tactus et gustus immutentur per medium?
4. Utrum tactus det esse animali sine quo animal esse non possit?
5. Utrum coelum sit coloratum?

The commentary draws on Aristotle's *Translatio vetus* of *De sensu et sensato*, which was the earliest, anonymous Latin translation of this work made either at the end of the twelfth or at the beginning of the thirteenth century (Galle, 2010: 47).⁴ The internal evidence (*lemmata*) for this is scant, because the *Translatio vetus* and Moerbeke's later revision of it sound alike in those passages. What is more significant, however, is its author extensive use of the marginal glosses accompanying it (the so-called Oxford gloss).⁵ By and large, the commentary is a reworking of glosses coming from two manuscripts, namely London, British Library, Ms. Royal 12.G.II and Cambridge, Gonville and Caius, Ms. 506 (384), in such a way that these glosses serve as determinations for particular dubitationes.

This phenomenon can be seen, for example, in the dubitatio whether only animals have appetites. The answer to the initial question is based on the note containing the threefold division of appetites. It states that appetite understood as the ability to distinguish between different kinds of food is that which Aristotle calls appetite. Consequently, only animals possess this kind of appetite.

⁴ For more on the translation see: Galle, 2008b: 105–150; Bloch, 2008: 83–103.

⁵ On the Oxford gloss see: Galle, 2008a: 197–281.

In addition to that, there are two other kinds of appetite: the basic one that is characteristic of everything that grows (whether it is an animal, a plant, or even a mineral), which is an indiscriminate desire, and something between the two, which is present in plants. In practice, the solution is nothing less than a creative philosophical recycling of ideas from the marginal note on f. 282r in Ms. Gonville and Caius 506 (384) saying that there are three kinds of appetite: the one which discerns, the one which does not, and the one between them. The author of the commentary transforms the note's position that it is the intellect that discerns, sensuality which does not, and that the natural appetite is between them.

It is interesting to note that the commentary itself does not consist of *dubitaciones* only. The first *dubitatio* in the second block is followed by an independent note on the order of the powers of the soul, which is peculiar because it has little relationship with the text of *De sensu et sensato* itself. It gives the reader an overview of the commentator's intellectual formation strongly supporting the claim that he studied at Oxford around the middle of the thirteenth century. The commentator writes that the capacities of the soul in every living being can be arranged in such a way that their positions reflect their level of perfection. According to him, perfection is inversely related with materiality: the more material and organic a power is, the lower is its position on the scale of perfection; conversely, the less material and, therefore, subtler it is, the higher is its position. Consequently, the vegetative power occupies the lowest position on the scale, since it is entirely contained in one's body. The sensitive power is second, because it is a little less material and organic. In a digression on the order of external senses that follows, he tries to explain why this is so. The sensitive power is subdivided into five senses, each of which is ranked according to its materiality. Consequently, there is the sense of touch at the bottom of the scale followed by taste, smell, hearing, and sight. Sight is the highest sense, because it is least material. By the same token, since the commentator considers light to be the form of all senses, in accordance with Robert Grosseteste, sight is the most luminous sense. The next position is the common sense, which is even less material and organic than sight. The commentator identifies heart as its organ; it there that sensations are collected and processed. The common sense is followed by imagination, a power even more subtle and immaterial, which is responsible for the process of abstraction. In animals, this power, along with common sense, is responsible for reasoning; it is less perfect than the active and possible intellects in human beings. The highest power is the distinctive power (*potentia distinctiva*) in animals, which is equivalent to the rational power (*potentia rationalis*) in humans. In its theoretical application, it is responsible for distinguishing between what is true and false, in its practical one, it discerns right from wrong. The note ends with a conclusion that it is the presence of light in matter which is responsible for the diversity of powers

of the soul as well as their order. It stresses the commentator's views that the light plays a crucial role to actions and operations of all living things: it is the first natural form of everything, and, therefore, it is the determining factor of each thing's perfection.

The note is significant for three reasons. The first is that the author belongs to the earliest commentators using the term "distinctive power" in the context of internal senses. Theodor Köhler, who misidentifies the author as Adam of Whitby, claimed that he the first Latin commentator to use this term (Köhler, 2014: 378). It is not entirely true, however, because there were several authors who made some use of it earlier, for example Albert the Great.⁶ What is even more important is that it testifies to the early reception of Averroes' commentaries on the *Parva naturalia* set in general and on *De memoria et reminiscencia* in particular.⁷ It is there that we find the theory of four internal senses, namely the common sense, imagination, distinctive power, and memory.⁸ This means that the commentary was written at a time when scholars' interest shifted away from earlier psychology and epistemology in the spirit of Neoplatonic doctrines found in *Liber de causis*, Avicenna's *De anima (Liber sextus de naturalibus)*,⁹ and Avicbron's *Fons vitae*, towards more a more Aristotelian approach (Callus, 1943: 38). According to Daniel Angelo Callus, who studied the reception of Aristotle at Oxford, this shift started ca. 1230, when Averroes' commentaries were translated into Latin and began circulating in

⁶ Albertus Magnus, 2017, *In De memoria et reminiscencia*, tract. 2, cap. 1 (ed. Donati, p. 125a–b): "Tertium autem est quam Arabes vocant virtutem distinctivam, quae est componens omnia haec et attribuens rei omnibus modis quibus attribui possunt per simile et contrarium et per locum et tempus et aliis modis, ut eliciatur intentum quod cecidit in oblivionem, sicut inferius monstrabimus".

⁷ Anselm Oelze asserts that the term *virtus distinctiva*, describing one of the internal senses, originates from the Latin version of Alhacen's *De aspectibus* (Oelze, 2018: 146). He believed that it was used in this meaning by Roger Bacon who equates it with the *virtus cogitativa*. Alhacen writes about the ability to grasp differences between various individuals within the same species and choose between them. This is evident in the example he uses to clarify his point: a child is given two apples; he or she is to choose which is prettier and, supposedly, more delicious. In an explanation which follows, Alhacen says that this ability has nothing to do with argumentation or reasoning. Moreover, the power of distinction is neither referred to as an internal sense nor treated as one there. Cf. Alhacen, 2001, *De aspectibus*, II, 3.38–39 (ed. Smith, p. 108–109). In our commentary, it does not seem to be the case. Thus, it appears highly improbable that the concept originated with Alhacen, considering that the commentator describes the distinctive virtue as "rational in human beings and capable of discerning true and false in speculation and good and bad in action".

⁸ Averroes Cordubensis, 1949, *In De memoria et reminiscencia* (ed. Shields, p. 58): "Secundus autem est esse istius forme in sensu communi et est primus ordinum spiritualium. Tertius est esse eius in virtute ymaginativa et est magis eo spiritualis. Quartus est in virtute distinctiva. Quintus est esse eius in virtute rememorativa".

⁹ For more on Avicenna's set of five internal senses and its reception in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries see: Hernández-Rubio, 2022: 133–162; Mansfeld, 2022: 235–242.

the academic circles. This is also when the popularity of literal commentaries (such as Adam of Buckfield's and Richard Rufus of Cornwall's) was at its peak. This tendency lasted until around 1260, when question-commentaries became the most popular commentary form (Callus, 1943: 38–49). In the light of this, both the doctrinal content of the commentary in M. 80 and its form — *dubitationes* — resembling proto-questions, suggest that it was written between 1230 and 1260, probably close to the latter date.

The second reason why the note is important is that it is a testimony of Robert Grosseteste's influence on Oxford academic milieu at that time. The author's views on the nature of light and the role it plays in natural processes strikingly resemble Robert Grosseteste's metaphysics of light.¹⁰ In the commentator's opinion, light (*lux*) is the first form of everything in nature. It is responsible for every action and operation in the natural world. What is even more interesting, light not only as responsible for the structure of the macrocosm but also for the one of the microcosm; here, the author find a new application of Grosseteste doctrine. He employs it in the physio-psychical considerations of the nature of the soul, where he uses the criterion of luminosity to establish levels of perfection of particular external and internal senses and their mutual relations.

Finally, what is quite surprising, the note on the powers of the soul reappears also in the question *An imaginatio et sensus communis sint eadem virtus an diversae?* on ff. 72vb–74ra, which belongs to a very peculiar commentary on *De anima* contained in Ms. M. 80. It forms a part of a determination and its form is slightly modified and extended. Since both commentaries appear to have been written by the same scholar, identifying the author of one would extend to the other. As we have already seen, neither internal nor external evidence in the *dubitationes* on *De sensu et sensato* permits such an identification; for the commentary on *De anima*, the situation is much more complicated. For it is difficult to determine whether it originally formed a single work (in which case it would be highly heterogeneous) or there were multiple independent commentaries on the *De anima* which were gathered together at some point to become the anthology we have today. Sten Ebbesen, who prepared a critical edition of a couple of questions from this set, draws attention to its complicated structure by arranging questions into four groups and names each of them using Greek letters.¹¹ Group α , which is

¹⁰ Robertus Grosseteste, 2013, *De luce* (ed. Panti, pp. 226–34). For more on Grosseteste's metaphysics of light as presented in both his *De luce* and *Hexaëmeron* see: Trepczyński, 2017: 101–103.

¹¹ Ebbesen observes that it is hard to trace the process, which led to the composition of the anthology, since the four groups appear to be independent (Ebbesen, 2020: 1–2). This lack of internal connection leads Wood to regard the four groups of questions as independent commentaries (Wood, 2022). On the other hand, Claudia Appolloni, who published four questions

largest, contains sixty-nine questions on book 2 (ff. 42ra–66rb) and seven on book 3 (ff. 66rb–69ra). In the next group, which is called β , there are twelve questions on book 2 (ff. 69rb–73vb) and five on book 3 (ff. 74ra–77vb). Interestingly, these end with a list of questions on book 3 (f. 78ra) which contains further fifteen question-titles on the nature of the intellect, but no answers appear to follow. Instead, there are two questions forming the group γ , which are devoted to the magnet (ff. 79ra–80va).¹² The last group, δ , consists of seventeen questions on book 1 (ff. 80vb–88vb).¹³ The note on the order of powers of the soul that reappears in the commentary on *De anima* can be found in a question from group β .

Unfortunately, all the questions remain anonymous save for some in the group α , where several questions are attributed to either Magister Adam of Whitby (who is interchangeably called Magister Adam, Adam, or just A.) or a certain Magister R. The attributions appear both on the margins (for instance, the note on the right margin on f. 44rb says: “Quaestio secundum magistrum A. de Wytheby”; another one, on f. 44v, informs that the question is “secundum magistrum Adam de Whyteb”, or “magister R” on f. 49vb) and, rarely, squeezed between the end of one question and the beginning of the next, even though the scribe had left no room there (Ebbesen, 2020: 21). In texts belonging to the group β , in which one can find our note, there are no hints on their authorship. And since the questions from this group differ significantly both doctrinally and stylistically from the ones in the group α , the only conclusion concerning their authorship to reach at this point is negative: they could not have been written either by Adam of Whitby or the mysterious Magister R. Therefore, the identity of the scholar who authored both the commentary on the *De sensu et sensato* and the questions on *De anima* from the group β is yet to be discovered.

on the imposition of words from this commentary, believes it is more of a combination of many separate question-commentaries combined into a single text. She observes that the same process of merging different sets of questions into a new one in order to exhaust a particular topic was also applied to other commentaries in M.80, giving an example of the Commentary on *De anima* written by Richard Rufus of Cornwall (Appolloni, 2021: 34). See also: Ottman *et al.*, 2018: 62.

¹² If they are anyhow related to the *De anima* itself, it is because they probably refer to a brief mention on the topic in book 1 (405a19–21). Ebbesen, 2020: 2.

¹³ For the list of questions together with information on which of them are accompanied by such notes, see: Ebbesen, 2020: 3–20.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary literature:

Abbreviation

ALD *Aristoteles Latinus Database*. Turnhout: Union Académique Internationale KUL/BREPOLiS (online).

Manuscript sources

Anonymus. *Commentarium in De anima Aristotelis*. Prague, Metropolitan Chapter, Ms. M. 80, ff. 42ra–88vb.

Anonymus. *Dubitationes super De sensu et sensato Aristotelis*. Prague, Metropolitan Chapter, Ms. M. 80, 131vb–132vb.

Oxford gloss. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library, Ms. 506 (384), ff. 282r–293r.

Oxford gloss. London, British Library, Ms. Royal 12.G.II, ff. 382v–397r.

Printed sources

Albertus Magnus. (2017). In *De memoria et reminiscencia* (pp. 113–137). In: *Alberti Magni opera omnia*, vol. VII, pars 2: *De nutrimento et nutrito, De sensu et sensato cuius secundus liber est de memoria et reminiscencia*. (S. Donati, Ed.). Münster: Aschendorff.

Alhacen. (2001). *De aspectibus* (vol. 1, pp. 3–641). In: A.M. Smith. *Alhacen's theory of visual perception: A critical edition, with English translation and commentary, of the first three books of Alhacen's De aspectibus, the medieval Latin version of Ibn al-Haytham's Kitāb al-Manāzīr*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.

Anonymus. *Liber sex principiorum*. (=ALD).

Aristoteles. *De sensu et sensato*. (=ALD).

Aristoteles. *De caelo*. (=ALD).

Aristoteles. *De anima*. (=ALD).

Aristoteles. *De somno et vigilia*. (=ALD).

Aristoteles. *Metaphysica*. (=ALD).

Averroes Cordubensis. (1949). *Compendium libri Aristotelis De memoria et reminiscencia* (pp. 47–76). In: A.L. Shields & H. Blumberg (Eds.). *Averrois Cordubensis compendia librorum Aristotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur*. Cambridge: Medieval Academy of America.

Robertus Grosseteste. (2013). *De luce* (pp. 193–238). (C. Panti, Ed.). In: J. Flood, J.R. Ginter, & J.W. Goering (Eds.). *Robert Grosseteste and his intellectual milieu: New editions and studies*. Toronto: Brepols.

Secondary literature:

Appolloni, C. (2021). A pragmatic theory of everyday imposition of words in an anonymous thirteenth-century commentary on *De anima* (Ms Prague, Metropolitan Chapter, M. 80, ff. 54vA–55rB). *Analiza i Egzystencja*, 54, 9–56.

Bloch, D. (2008). Nicolaus Graecus and the *Translatio vetus* of Aristotle's *De sensu*. *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale*, 50, 83–103.

Callus, D.A. (1943). Introduction of Aristotelian learning to Oxford (vol. 24, pp. 1–55). In: *Proceedings of the British Academy. 1943*. London: Oxford University Press.

Ebbesen, S. (2020). An anthology of questions on *De anima* in ms Praha, MK M. 80. An analysis with an edition of selected questions. *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin*, 89, 1–44.

- Galle, G. (2008a). Edition and discussion of the Oxford Gloss on *De sensu* 1. *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age*, 75, 197–281.
- Galle, G. (2008b). The anonymous translator of the *Translatio vetus* of *De sensu*. *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale*, 50, 105–150.
- Galle, G. (2010). Interpretations of the *Translatio vetus* of *De sensu* 1 in commentaries attributed to Adam of Buckfield and in the “Oxford gloss” (pp. 47–66). In: P. Bernardini (Ed.). *I Manoscritti e la filosofia: Atti della giornata Internazionale di studi, Siena, 18 aprile 2007*. Siena: Università degli studi di Siena.
- Hernández-Rubio, P. (2022). The role of the intentio individualis in Albert the Great's sense perception theory (pp. 133–162). In: M. Gensler, M. Mansfeld, & M. Michałowska (Eds.). *The embodied soul: Aristotelian psychology and physiology in medieval Europe between 1200 and 1420*. Cham: Springer.
- Köhler, T.W. (2014). Homo animal nobilissimum. *Konturen des spezifisch Menschlichen in der naturphilosophischen Aristoteleskommentierung des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts* (vol. 2.1). Leiden–Boston: Brill.
- Mansfeld, M. (2022). *The world of senses. On the process of cognition in Walter Burley* (pp. 135–152). In: M. Gensler, M. Mansfeld, & M. Michałowska (Eds.). *The embodied soul: Aristotelian psychology and physiology in medieval Europe between 1200 and 1420*. Cham: Springer.
- Oelze, A. (2018). *Animal rationality: Later medieval theories 1250–1350*. Leiden–Boston: Brill.
- Ottman, J.R., Wood, R., Lewis, N., & Martin, C.J. (2018). Introduction (p. 62). In: Richard Rufus of Cornwall. *Sententia cum quaestionibus in libros De anima Aristotelis*. (J.R. Ottman, R. Wood, N. Lewis, C.J. Martin, Eds.). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Trepczyński, M. (2017). Światło jako arché świata. *Metafizyka światła Roberta Grosseteste. Ethos*, 30, 93–115.
- Wood, R. (2022). *Ms Description: M80*. Retrieved from: <http://rrp.stanford.edu/pragM80-xml.html> (11.12.2022).

ANONYMUS

DUBITATIONES SUPER *DE SENSU ET SENSATO* ARISTOTELIS

1 | *Quoniam autem de anima* (436a1) etc.

M 131vb

<Dubitatio 1: Utrum sensus, memoria, ira, desiderium, appetitus
et gaudium sint operationes communes corpori et animae?>

Prima dubitatio super hoc quod dicit sensum, memoriam, iram, desiderium,
5 et similiter appetitum et gaudium et tristitiam esse operationes communes
corpori et animae.

Contra: nullum istorum dicit operationem sed habitum et potentiam. Sen-
sus enim nominat potentiam et virtutem sensitivam.

Et dicendum quod ponit nomina habituum et potentiarum pro nominibus
10 operationum sensus.

<Dubitatio 2: An sensus sit communis coniuncto ex corpore et anima?>

Secundo dubitatur specialiter an sensus sit communis coniuncto ex corpore et
anima.

Et videtur quod sic, quia procedit ex utrisque et non ex altero tantum (sen-
15 sus enim est perfectio animalis in quantum animal); sed animal est compositum
ex corpore et anima; ergo sensus est ipsius coniuncti.

Sed contra: si sensus est communis corpori et animae (sed omne commune
prius est naturaliter his quibus est commune), ergo sensus prius naturaliter est
quam anima vel corpus, quod est impossibile; ergo sensus non est commune
20 his.

Ad idem: omne commune pluribus inest cuilibet per se, verbi gratia animal
equo per se inest, similiter et homini; si ergo sensus est communis corpori et
animae, potest inesse utrique per se, ac hoc falsum (corpus enim non habet
sensus antequam anima sensitiva sibi uniatur nec etiam anima sensitiva actu
25 est antequam fuerit educta de principiis materiae vel materialibus per agens
extra; igitur, ut videtur, sensus non erit communis corpori et animae.

4–6 Cf. Aristoteles, *De sensu et sensato*, 1, 436a7–11 (*Translatio anonyma*, ed. Galle & Peeters, in preparation): “Videntur autem maxime et communia et propria animalium communia esse et corporis et anime, quemadmodum sensus, memoria, ira, desiderium et omnino appetitus, et cum hiis gaudium et tristitia; etenim hec fere insunt omnibus animalibus”. I would like to thank G. Galle for sharing the most recent version of the edition with me. This edition is a profound reworking of L. Peeters unpublished MA-dissertation: *De sensu et sensato — Translatio vetus. Voorbereiding voor een Kritische editie*, Leuven 1996. 9–10 Cf. London, British Library, Ms. Royal 12.G.II, f. 382v, *in marg. sin.*: “Sensus: intellige quod ponit nomina habituum et potentiarum pro nominibus operationum. Ponit enim sensum pro sentire, quod nominat operationem sensus”.

Dicendum quod commune dupliciter dicitur: aut enim secundum rationem, quod est praedicabile de pluribus, et hoc est prius natura et cuilibet illorum potest inesse per se; aut dicitur commune secundum rem, quod efficitur ex
 30 coniunctione aliquorum ad invicem, et hoc est posterius natura illis quibus inest nec potest inesse alteri illorum per se sed coniuncto ex utrisque. Sic vero se habet sensus ad animal quod est coniunctum ex corpore et anima. Operatio enim virtutis sensitivae non inest animae separatae a corpore nec corpori separato ab anima, sed statim anima sensitiva unita corpori facit operationem
 35 virtutis sensitivae in coniuncto, scilicet animali.

<Dubitatio 3: Utrum memoria sit operatio coniuncti ex corpore et anima?>
 Tertio dubitatur de memoria. Videtur enim quod ipsa non fit operatio coniuncti ex corpore et anima. Memoria enim est scientia praeteritorum quae vere est
 40 in prima causa et in intelligentiis quae separantur ab omni corpore et imaginatione, eo quod sunt pura forma et lux, et maxime prima causa.

Et dicendum quod memoria dicitur dupliciter, quia communiter et proprie. Memoria enim proprie est in nobis, cum memoria fuerit scientia alicuius rei prius oblitae, cuiusmodi scientia non cadit in prima causa, sed in potentia est memoria communiter et improprie, quia per intuitionem de praesenti omnia
 45 praeterita et futura sunt sibi nota convertendo se supra se et a rebus extra scientiam non recipiendo.

<Dubitatio 4: Utrum ira et desiderium sint operationes
 coniuncti ex corpore et anima?>

Quarto dubitatur de ira et desiderio. Si enim ira aliqua est cum ratione, similiter et desiderium, ergo anima rationalis in quantum talis et separata a corpore
 50 potest irasci et desiderare, non ergo sunt ira et desiderium operationes coniuncti ex corpore et anima.

Dicendum quod, cum ira sit passio haec abiciens a substantia, quia ira est accessivus sanguis circa cor, non potest ira esse nisi operatio coniuncti, sed
 55 propter hoc nihil prohibet iram aliquando esse cum ratione, aliquando sine desiderio.

27–32 Cf. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius, Ms. 506 (384), f. 282r, *in marg. sin.*: “Nota quod commune dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum praedicationem, et sic dicitur universale commune illis de quibus praedicatur; alio modo dicitur commune illud quod fit omni ex coniunctione aliquorum ad invicem, et tale est posterius naturaliter illis quibus est commune, et hoc modo est sensus communis animae et corpori”. 53–56 Cf. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius, Ms. 506 (384), f. 282r, *in marg. dex.*: “Nota quod ira est accensus sanguinis circa cor cum appetitu poenae vel vindictae, qui appetitus non omnibus habentibus sanguinem inest sed tantum habentibus fel”.

33 sensitivae] sentiente *ms.*

Notandum sicut prius quod desiderium ipsum dicitur dupliciter, scilicet communiter et proprie. Desiderium proprie est in absentia. Unde in alio saeculo proprie loquendo non desiderabimus. Desiderium vero communiter et improprie potest esse in animalibus et in intelligentiis. Anima enim intelligendo se ipsam potest habere desiderium alicuius rei futurae, quoniam parentis vel amici, sed haec res de futuro animae non est absens sed praesens, quia anima separata intelligendo se intelligit omnia, et sic animae per se proprie non est desiderium.

65 <Dubitatio 5: Utrum gaudium et tristitia sint operationes
coniuncti ex corpore et anima?>

Quinto dubitatur de gaudio et tristitia: cum enim sint communia, et communia nata sunt etc., ergo gaudium et tristitia sunt circa idem; sed gaudium potest esse animae separatae a corpore; ergo et tristitia, et sic, ut videtur, non sint
70 operationes coniuncti ex corpore et anima.

Sed contra dicit Aristoteles quod nihil aliud | est dicere animam gaudere et
tristari quam texere etc.; sed impossibile est animam texere vel aedificare; ergo
impossibile est animam gaudere vel tristari. Et hoc verum est de anima per se
separata a corpore, secundum quod gaudium et tristitia sunt passiones illatae
75 a rebus sensibilibus extra. Gaudium enim est ex dilatione sanguinis circa cor
propter speciem delectabilem rei sensibilis extra receptam in anima, tristitia
vero propter speciem deformem et non iocundam receptam in anima, ut patet
de morte amicorum vel infirmitate percepta ab anima efficiuntur aliqui tristes.

Ad solutionem primae rationis qua videtur quod gaudium et tristitia sunt
80 in anima separata a corpore dicendum quod neutrum illorum proprie sumpto,
gaudio vel tristitia, inest animae separatae, sed gaudio et tristitia sumptis com-
muniter et improprie licet dicere quod insunt animae separatae. Anima enim
separata intelligendo se potest intelligere omnia et sic habere gaudium de ami-
cis in hoc saeculo, si fuerunt moribus et virtutibus decorati. Aliter enim non
85 diceret theologia quod magis est gaudium super uno peccatore poenitentiam
agente quam super nonaginta iustis poenitentiam non agentibus.

<Dubitatio 6: Utrum somnus et vigilia insint omnibus animalibus?>

Sexto restat dubitare super hoc quod dixit quod somnus et vigilia non insunt omnibus animalibus, cum probatum fuerit in *Somno et vigilia* quod omnibus

71–72 Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima*, I, 4, 408b12–13 (*Translatio Jacobi Venetici*, ed. Decorte & Brams, ALDatabase): “Dicere autem irasci animam simile est et si quis dicitu animam texere et edificare”. 85–86 Luc. 15,7. 89–90 Cf. Aristoteles, *De somno et vigilia*, 2, 455a10–11 (*Translatio anonyma saec. XII*, ed. Drossaart Lulofs, p. 3): “[...] Manifestum quoniam omnibus necessarium est inesse eadem passionem in eo quod vocatur sompnus [...]”.

68 gaudium] gaudia *ms.* 77 receptam] recepertam *ms.*

M 132ra

90 animalibus insunt animali ratione. Somnus est impotentia sensus; sed in omni
 animali contingit fieri impotentia sensus; ergo in omni animali contingit fieri
 somnus. Sed somnus et vigilia sunt contraria ut privative opposita; ergo, si
 somnus inest etc. et vigilia...

Et concedenda est haec conclusio et quod dicit Aristoteles hic dicit pro
 95 opinione communi, quoniam opinio communis est quod animalia palpebras
 non-habentia somnum non habent, et hoc ideo, quia hic non intendit secun-
 dum subtilitatem et veritatem de somno et vigilia determinare, sed ubi intendit
 de somno et vigilia determinare secundum veritatem inquirat suam veritatem,
 scilicet quod insunt omnibus animalibus.

100

<Dubitatio 7: Utrum appetitus solum inest animalibus?>

Septimo dubitatur super hoc quod dictum est quod appetitus solum inest
 animalibus.

Contra hoc sic potest argui: omne quod cibatur, cum caret cibo, appetit
 cibum; sed planta cibatur, ergo appetit cibum; non ergo appetitus solum inest
 105 animalibus.

Et ad id dicendum quod est appetitus triplex: alius est cum discretione, et
 hic solum inest habentibus sensum; alius est sine <discretione>, et hic inest
 animalibus et omnibus viventibus et non-viventibus; alius est medius inter haec
 participans naturam utriusque, et hic inest plantis. Et solum intendit hic de
 110 appetitu primo modo dicto.

Sed de sensu et sentire (436b8).

<Dubitatio 1: Utrum sensus ita se habeat ad animal quod ipso
 posito ponitur animal et ipso destructo destruitur?>

Prima dubitatio est super hoc quod dicit sensum ita se habere ad animal quod
 115 ipso posito ponitur animal et ipso destructo destruitur.

Contra: sensus causatur ex coniunctione animae cum corpore quae con-
 iunctio facit animal; sensus ergo est sicut causatum et animal sicut causa; sed
 a destructione causati non sequitur destructio causae.

94–99 Cf. London, British Library, Ms. Royal 12.G.II, f. 382v, *in marg. dex.*: “Exemplum
 de his qui insunt quibusdam animalibus et non omnibus secundum opinionem quorundam
 quod somnus et vigilia non insunt animalibus palpebris carentibus, tamen in veritate non ita
 sit, quia somnus omni animali inest”. 106–110 Cf. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius, Ms. 506
 (384), f. 282r, *in marg. sin.*: “Nota quod appetitus tripliciter est: uno modo cum discretione, ut
 appetitus intellectualis, alio modo sine discretione, ut appetitus sensualis, tertio modo dicitur
 appetitus naturalis qui medius inter haec est”. 114–115 Cf. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius,
 Ms. 506 (384), f. 282r, *in marg. dex.*: “Quia sensus est differentia essentialis qua posita ponitur
 animal et qua destructa destruitur animal”.

97 determinare] doctrinare *ms.*

Item, a destructione posterioris non sequitur destructio prioris; cum ergo
 120 animal prius naturaliter sit quam agat per sensum, et haec patet, quia virtus
 sensitiva est in substantia animalis et operatio et actio procedit a virtute; prius
 ergo naturaliter est animal quam agat per virtutem sensitivam; ergo a destructio-
 ne sensus non sequitur destructio animalis.

Item, prima essentia animalis sunt materia et forma; sed virtus sensitiva non
 125 est haec forma, ut videtur, quia forma essentialis semper actu est in eo cuius est;
 sensitiva vero non semper actu est in animali, quod patet in tempore dormitio-
 nis in quo operatur vegetativa in animali et non sensitiva; ergo sensitiva est for-
 ma accidentalis animalis, a cuius destructione non sequitur destructio subiecti.

Ad primum dicendum quod causatum duplex est: passio per se vel per acci-
 130 dens. A destructione vero passionis per se sequitur destructio | subiecti quan- M 132rb
 tum ad esse accidentale; et sic se habet sensus ad animal. A destructione vero
 passionis accidentalis non sequitur destructio subiecti.

Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus ita se habet ad animal quod cum ani-
 mal est in potentia, ut patet in embrione, sensus erit in potentia, et cum animal
 135 est actu, sensus erit actu. Potest tamen eius actus et operatio latere nos. Unde
 respondendum per interemptionem ad hoc quod dicitur quod animal est prius
 natura sensu.

Ad tertium dicendum quod sensitiva est forma essentialis animalis unde
 animal, sensus vero facit sicut rationale mortale hominem. Respondendum
 140 ergo tertiae rationi per interemptionem propter hoc quod quod prima forma
 naturalis adveniens materiae numquam facit animal antequam illa forma fuerit
 sensitiva, et tunc statim dicitur animal a sensu. Et dico formam sensitivam
 solum illam quae potest immutari a qualitatibus sensibilibus, id est naturalibus
 primis, ut est frigidum, calidum, humidum, siccum, vel secundariis, ut album,
 145 nigrum.

<Nota de ordine inter virtutes animae>

Propter hoc hic nota diligenter ordinem inter virtutes animae. Quaedam enim
 <sunt> grossiores et materialiores, et hae magis dicuntur organicae, quia sitae
 sunt in aliqua parte determinata ipsius corporis deputata ad tale opus. Quae-
 150 dam enim sunt subtiliores et spiritualiores, et hae minus sunt organicae.

Est ergo ordo talis in primo gradu et inter grossiores virtutes est virtus vege-
 tativa, quae indifferenter est in animalibus et plantis, cuius organa fere omnes
 partes sunt corporis et maxime quattuor partes principales, ut cor etc.

147–150 Cf. *Commentarium in De anima Aristotelis*, Ms. 80, f. 73va: “Ad hoc dicendum
 quod ex virtutibus animae quaedam sunt grossiores et materialiores, et hae magis dicun-
 tur organicae, quaedam vero subtiliores et spiritualiores, et hae minus dicuntur organicae”.

151–153 Cf. *Commentarium in De anima Aristotelis*, Ms. 80, f. 73va: “Et est ordo talis: in

140 rationi] rationem *ms.*

Secundo in ordinatione inter virtutes grossiores est sensus particularis, in
 155 quo etiam sunt gradus in grossitie et subtilitate. Tactus enim est sensuum partic-
 ularium grossissimus, deinde gustus, tertio olfactus, quarto auditus, quinto
 visus qui sensuum particularium magis spiritualis et subtilis est, quia inter
 ceteros sensus particulares virtus viva maxime habet de luce quae est forma
 cuiuslibet sensus et minime de materia; alii sensus e converso, quia tactus
 160 maxime de materia et minime de luce habet.

Post sensum particularem statim in ordine sic procedit virtus subtilior ac
 superior, scilicet sensus communis, cuius organum et origo est in corde, ubi
 est primus concursus omnium organorum quinque sensuum particularium. Et
 quia sensitiva communis est subtilior et superior quolibet sensu particulari,
 165 ideo minus apparet organica, id est habere situm in parte determinata corporis.
 Et ideo difficilius est invenire organum sensus communis distinctum ab organis
 quinque sensuum particularium quam sit invenire organum visus, scilicet ocu-
 lum, distinctum ab organo alterius sensus particularis. Et nota de sensu com-
 muni quod sic se habet ad sensus particulares, sicut punctus in cono pyramidis
 170 et sicut ab uno fonte emanarent quinque rivuli, sic a sensu communi tamquam
 a puncto in cono fluunt quinque sensus particulares per totum corpus animalis.
 Et iuxta hoc patet illud notabile, scilicet qualiter sensus communis est unus
 quamvis fuit in multis: sicut punctus est unus.

Post hanc virtutem sensitivam communem succedit in ordine virtus superi-
 175 or et subtilior, scilicet imaginativa, quae est minus organica quam sensus com-
 muni et fortasse ideo notificatur per nomen abstractionis, scilicet imaginatio.

primo gradu ex grossioribus est virtus vegetativa, cuiusmodi organa fere sunt omnes partes corporis et maxime quattuor partes principales". 154–160 Cf. *Commentarium in De anima Aristotelis*, Ms. 80, f. 73va: "Secundo est sensus particularis in quo etiam sunt gradus in grossitie et subtilitate. Tactus enim est sensuum grossissimus, deinde gustus, tertio olfactus, quarto auditus, quinto visus". 161–173 Cf. *Commentarium in De anima Aristotelis*, Ms. 80, f. 73va: "Post enim sensum particularem succedit subtilior ac superior virtus, scilicet sensus communis, cuius organum et origo ibidem est in corpore, ubi est primus concursus omnium organorum quinque particularium sensuum. Et haec virtus, quia superior est et subtilior quolibet sensu particulari, ideo minus apparet organica. Unde multo difficilius est invenire organum sensus communis distinctum ab organis quinque sensuum particularium quam sit invenire organum visus distinctum ab organo alterius sensus particularis. Praeterea, haec virtus quae sensus communis dicitur semper coeratur cum sensibilibus particularibus et non est se mota ab organis eorum, quamvis originaliter dicatur consuisse in concursu illorum organorum, sicut punctus in cono pyramidis. Sed si non haberet ortum aliunde quam in ipsis organis particularibus, non esset virtus una nec superior illis". 174–185 Cf. *Commentarium in De anima Aristotelis*, Ms. 80, f. 73va–vb: "Post hanc succedit virtus superior et subtilior, scilicet virtus imaginativa, quae adhuc minus organica est quam sensus communis, et hoc quia spiritualior est, ideo in ipsa magis unitur sua operatio cum sua substantia quam uniatu operatio cum substantia in sensu. Et haec est causa quare per abstractivum nomen operationis nominatur, scilicet per hoc nomen 'imaginatio'. Haec autem virtus semper cooperatur cum sensu communi, sicut sensus communis cum sensibus particularibus et etiam aliquo modo sicut intellectus agens cum intellectu

Haec vero virtus imaginativa semper quo operatur cum sensu communi, sicut
 sensus communis cooperatur cum sensibus particularibus et sicut intellectus
 180 agens qui operatur cum intellectu possibili. Unde nota hic quod in brutis loco
 intellectu agentis est imaginativa coniuncta cum sensu communi quae ponit
 similitudines et imaginationes rerum sensibilibus extra abstrahere et appetere,
 sed haec imaginativa in brutis coniuncta cum sensu communi non attingit ad
 subtilitatem intellectus agentis coniuncti cum intellectu possibili in homine.
 Et ideo subtiliores sunt actiones humanae quam brutales, quia cum maiori
 185 deliberatione et ratione principium et finem ordinantur. |

M 132va

Post virtutem vero imaginativam succedit in ordine et subtilitate virtus dis-
 tinctiva quae est rationalis in homine. Et potest distinguere verum a falso quan-
 tum ad speculationem et bonum a malo quantum ad practicam et operationem.

190 Nota ergo totam hanc distinctionem et diversitatem virtutum ad invicem
 a diversitate incorporationis lucis in sua materia secundum maiorem subtili-
 tatem et minorem causari. A luce enim est omnis actio et operatio naturalis.

possibili. Unde si in sensu ponatur esse aliquod receptivum ad instar intellectus possibilis et
 aliud abstractivum ad instar intellectus agentis, forte posset dici probabiliter quod receptivum
 est sensus, quia, ut dicit Aristoteles, passiva potentia est et, in quantum passiva, receptiva:
 quod enim patitur, recipit. Et abstractivum est imaginatio. Sed quia imaginatio non attingit
 ad subtilitatem intellectus ex qua magna distantia, ideo non ita potest poni abstractivum quin
 (?) et receptivum sicut intellectus agens". 186–188 Cf. *Commentarium in De anima Ari-*
stotelis, Ms. 80, f. 73vb: "Post imaginationem succedit in subtilitate praedicationis distinctiva
 sive rationalis, cui in homine coniungitur intellectus et ratio, in brutis vero nequaquam, sed
 numquid, supple: in homine, operatur cum imaginatione intellectus, sicut imaginatio cum
 sensu communi et sensus communis cum <sensibus> particularibus. Si sic, ergo non sineret in-
 tellectus, qui supple: virtus est in imaginatione, construere falsitatem nec suggeret imaginatio
 aliquid contrarium rationi, licet vero suggeret sensus communis aliquid non imaginabile. Ad
 hoc dicendum quod quoad quid simile est de intellectu quam ad imaginationem et de imagi-
 natione quam ad sensum communem, scilicet quod quoad duo. Quorum unum est quod, sicut
 imaginatio accipit species a sensu communi ipsas magis abstrahendo et a materia denudando,
 ita retinet penes ipsas intellectus ab imaginatione: species accipit illas multo magis abstrahendo
 et a conditionibus materialibus denudando, ita ut sint universalialia quae ipse intellectus retinet
 penes se. Et aliud est quod sicut imaginatio informat et magis perficit ac validiorem reddit
 sensum in apprehendendo et iudicando, a simili intellectus imaginationem informat et perficit
 et validiorem ac nobiliorem reddit, et per consequens sensum communem". Cf. *Commenta-*
rium in De anima Aristotelis, Ms. 80, f. 72vb: "Item, Averroes super capitulum de memoria et
 reminiscencia quinque dicit esse gradus speciei sensualis sive quinque esse quorum tria sunt
 supra dicta [sc. sensus particularis, sensus communis et imaginativa — *add. MM*] et quartum
 est esse eius in virtute distinctiva. Et intelligit per virtutem distinctivam virtutem rationalem in
 hominibus et virtutem illam in brutis quae in eis ... vice rationis. Habent enim quaedam bruta
 etsi non rationem, tamen virtutem similem rationi per quam discernunt, cogitant, invenient
 et quasi rationantur et deliberant. Et haec virtus inest eis a natura soletque vocari distinctiva.
 Quintum esse habet virtute memorativa".

181 appetere] apparere *ms.* 182 sensu] sensitiva *ms.*

Lux ergo erit prima forma naturalis, cum a forma procedat actio et operatio. Sed quia receptum est in recipiente per naturam et conditionem materiae recipientis et non formae receptae, necesse est res naturales diversificari et multiplicari secundum quod diversimode recipitur lux in diversis <rebus> materialibus.

<Dubitatio 2: Utrum tactus et gustus insint omni animali?>

Secunda dubitatio est super hoc quod dicitur tactum et gustum inesse omni animali.

Contra: gustus nulli inest nisi cui inest organum gustandi, scilicet lingua; sed animalibus imperfectis, cuiusmodi sunt vermes et animalia capita non habentia, non inest organum gustandi; ergo nec gustus.

Dicendum quod animalibus perfectis, cuiusmodi sunt capita habentia, inest organum gustus determinatum et deputatum ad gustum. Animalibus vero imperfectis inest organum gustus indeterminate, unde fortassis in vermibus est organum gustus per totum corpus indistinctum sicut et organum tactus est per totum corpus. In animalibus vero perfectis tactus est ubique in corpore, gustus vero in parte determinata.

<Dubitatio 3: Utrum tactus et gustus immutentur per medium?>

Tertia dubitatio super hoc quod singulat sensum tactus et gustus immutari a qualitate sensibili extra, ut a calido, frigido, humido, sicco, sine medio, sensum vero visus et auditus immutari ab eisdem qualitatibus sensibilibus, ut visuem immutari a speciebus coloris et auditum immutari a sono per medium, scilicet aerem.

Contra: probat enim Aristoteles in libro *De anima* quod omnis sensus immutatur per medium; ergo tactus et gustus immutantur per medium, quod videtur falsum.

Dicendum quod hoc est verum, sed dissimiliter, quia tactus et gustus immutantur per medium intrinsecum, ut per carnem, vel si quid aliud fuerit medium in tactu et gustu, de quo medio dubium sit quid sit illud. Sensus vero visus et auditus et olfactus immutantur per medium extrinsecum, scilicet aerem, quod medium non est pars corporis. Nisi enim aer sit medium inter visibile et videns non videbimus, similiter nisi aer sit medium inter sonabile et auditum non audiemus, similiter est de olfactu. Sed sine aeris medio bene sentimus tactu, similiter et gustu, quoniam tactus et gustus fiunt per medium intrinsecum quod est pars corporis, sed non per medium extrinsecum, cuiusmodi est aer. E converso visus et auditus fiunt per medium extrinsecum, scilicet aerem, et non intrinsecum quod est pars corporis.

214–215 Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima*, II, 11, 423b3 (*Translatio Jacobi Venetici*, ed. Decorte & Brams, ALDatabase): “Quoniam sentimus omnia per medium”.

219 medio] medium *ms.*

<Dubitatio 4: Utrum tactus det esse animali
sine quo animal esse non possit?>

230 Quarto dubitatur super hoc quod dicitur quod tactus dat esse animali sine quo animal esse non possit.

Contra: quidquid dat esse, nobilior est eo quod non dat esse; sed tactus dat esse animali et visus non, ut hic dicitur; ergo tactus nobilior est visu, quod falsum est, ut probatur *De somno et vigilia*; ergo tactus non dat esse animali.

235 Ad idem: nobilioris causae nobilior est causatum; sed causa et perfectio visus nobilior est causa quam sit causa sensus tactus; ergo visus est nobilior quam tactus. Minor patet per hoc quod perfectio et causa visus est a visibili, visibile vero perfectio est a luce, quae lux nobilior <est> quam aliqua perfectio sensus tactus; visus ergo nobilior <est> tactu; sed visus non dat esse animali;
240 ergo nec tactus.

Ad oppositum: destructo tactu destruitur et visus et similiter omnis sensus, quoniam tactus est radix omnium sensuum; ergo tactus est nobilior visu; ergo tactus dat esse animali quamvis non visus.

245 Ad idem: tactus solus ita se habet ad animal quod ipso destructo destruitur animal. Omnes vero alii sensus vel ad esse animalis conferunt, ut gustus, vel conservant animal in esse, ut visus et auditus et olfactus. Tactus ergo dat esse animali et nullus alius sensus. Et ita tactus, ut videtur, est nobilior aliis sensibus.

250 Dicendum probabiliter quod respiciendo | ad operationes sensuum et ad effectus illorum erit tactus sensus nobilissimus, respiciendo vero ad causam visibilis et visus, scilicet ad lucem, dicendum quod visus est nobilior tactu. M 132vb

Praeterea, respiciendo ad ordinem sensuum dicendum quod alii sensus sunt nobiliores tactu. Tactus enim naturaliter est primus sensuum et in potentia ad omnes alios sensus. Alii vero sensus, cum sint naturaliter posteriores tactu,
255 sunt tamquam actus respectu ipsius tactus; et actus est nobilior potentia.

<Dubitatio 5: Utrum coelum sit coloratum?>

Quinto dubitatur super hoc quod dicitur omnia corpora esse colorata.

260 Contra: coelum est corpus, non tamen <est> coloratum. Probo: color est qualitas habens contrarium; sed in coelo non est qualitas habens contrarium; ergo in coelo non est color. Maior patet per se, minor per librum *Coeli et mundi*.

233–234 Cf. Aristoteles, *De somno et vigilia*, 2, 455a7–8 (*Translatio anonyma saec. XII*, ed. Drossaert Lulofs, p. 34): “Quoniam vero quedam quidem habent sensus omnes, quedam vero non habent, ut talpa visum, tactum autem et gustum universa habent [...]”. 244–245 London, British Library, Ms. Royal 12.G.II, f. 383r, *in marg. sin.*: “Per sensum distinguitur animal a non-animale, quia si habet sensum, est animal, si non, non”. 260–261 Cf. Aristoteles,

Ad idem: omne coloratum est alterabile (hoc patet per se); sed coelum non est alterabile, quia coelum mutatur de ubi in ubi, ut patet per undecimum *Metaphysicae*; ergo coelum non est coloratum.

265 Item, omne coloratum habet in se qualitates tangibiles, ut calidum, frigidum, humidum, siccum, quod patet in capitulo de tactu et tangibili in libro *De anima*; sed coelum non habet qualitates tangibiles, ut patet in libro *Coeli et mundi*; ergo coelum non est coloratum. Et hoc est verum nisi quis dicat colorem aequivoce esse in coelo et in istis rebus inferioribus in quibus proprie est color.

270 Ad oppositum, scilicet quod coelum sit coloratum, sic videtur: omne corpus est coloratum, ut dicitur in *Libro sex principiorum* et in *Praedicamentis*; sed coelum est corpus, quia <est> primum omnium corporum; ergo coelum est coloratum.

275 Ad idem: inferius in hoc libro habetur quod color est ultimum corporis perspicui terminati; sed coelum est corpus perspicuum, id est clarum, habens ultimum terminatum, id est superficiem ultimam connexam quae non procedit in infinitum; ergo coelum est coloratum.

De caelo, II, 5, 287b22–28 (Translatio Roberti Grosseteste, ed. Bossier; ALDatabase): “Quia autem est dupliciter in circulo moveri, velut ab a- hunc quidem qui ad b-, hunc autem quid ad g-, quoniam igitur non sunt contrarii ipsi, prius dictum est. Sed si nichil ut contingit neque a per se caus <contingit> in sempiternis esse, celum autem sempiternum et circularis latio, propter quandam aliquando causam in unum duorum fertus, sed non in alterum duorum”. 263–264 Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, XI, 8, 1073a24–34 (Translatio Anonymi saec. XII uel XIII, ed. Vuillemin-Diem, pp. 215–216): “Principium enim et primum entium est immobile et secundum se et secundum accidens, movens enim primum sempiternum et unum motum; sed quoniam quod motum est necesse ab aliquo moveri, et primum movens immobile esse secundum se, et sempiternum motum a sempiterno moveri et unum ab uno, videmus autem preter universi simplicem ferentiam, quam movere dicimus primam substantiam et immobilem, alias ferentias quascumque planerum sempiternas (sempiternum enim et instabile circulo corpus; ostensum est autem in *Physicis* de hiis), necessarium harum quamlibet ferentiarum ab immobili moveri secundum se et sempiterna substantia”. 265–267 Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima*, II, 11, 422b23–24 (Translatio Jacobi Venetici, ed. Decorte & Brams, ALDatabase): “In eo autem quod tangi potest multe sunt contrarietates: calidum frigidum, siccum humidum, durum molle, et aliorum quaecumque sunt huiusmodi”. 267–268 Cf. Aristoteles, *De caelo*, II, 4, 287a32–287b2 (Translatio Roberti Grosseteste, ed. Bossier; ALDatabase): “Si enim aqua quidem est circa terram, aer autem circa aquam — et superiora corpora secundum eandem rationem (continua quidem enim non sunt, tandunt autem hec) aque autem superficies spheriformis est, spheriformi autem continuum vel positum circa spheriforme et ipsum tale necessarium esse; quare et utique per hoc manifestum utique erit quoniam spheriforme est celum”. 270–271 Cf. Anonymus, *Libro sex principiorum*, 65 (ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 50): “Non est autem pallidum ad nigrum vel album contrarium; etenim cum utroque in eodem est; pallidum enim et colores reliqui ex albo et nigro conficiuntur; necessarium ergo est, un quocumque pallidum est, in omni quidem eo esse album et nigrum. Similiter autem et de ceteris coloribus”. Aristoteles, *Praedicamenta*, 2, 1a28 (Translatio Boethii, ed. Minio-Paluello; ALDatabase): “[...] omnis enim color in corpore est”.

275 habetur] Item infra dicit quod omnia corpora colore participant quarto (?) in marg. dex.

Ad idem: color est immutativum visus secundum actum lucidi, ut dicitur
 280 in secundo *De anima*, id est color gignit suam speciem in oculo, cum aer lu-
 cidus in potentia fuerit actu illuminatus a Sole, ut ab aliqua stella, vel etiam
 ab igne; sed coelum immutat visum secundum actum lucidi; ergo coelum est
 coloratum. Minor patet per hoc quod videmus coelum; ergo coelum immutat
 visum secundum actum lucidi.

Et sciendum quod istae rationes concludunt falsum, scilicet coelum esse
 285 coloratum.

Ad primam ergo rationem dicendum: cum dicitur: ‘omne corpus est
 coloratum’, hoc intelligendum est de istis corporibus inferioribus et non
 supracoelestibus.

Ad secundam rationem dicendum quod corpus ad hoc quod fuerit colora-
 290 tum necesse est quod terminetur in corporalitate ad superficiem nec procedat
 ulterius in perspicuitate, similiter ad eandem superficiem terminetur, et sic
 terminantur omnia corpora inferiora, et ideo sunt colorata. Coelum non est
 sic terminatum, quia in corporeitate terminatur coelum ad superficiem suam
 connexam nec procedit in infinitum. In perspicuitate vero non est coelum ter-
 295 minatum ad suam superficiem, immo procedit ista claritas ulterius quam sit
 superficies coeli. Si vero esset perspicuitas coeli terminata ad suam superficiem,
 lux corporis coelestis superficiem coeli non transcendet, quod est falsum. Non
 est igitur coelum terminatum in perspicuitate, ergo nec coloratum.

Nota hic quod duo requiruntur maxime ad hoc quod corpus fuerit colora-
 300 tum, scilicet terminatio in corporeitate et similiter in perspicuitate, quorum
 alterum, scilicet terminatio in perspicuitate, deficit in coelo; et ideo ipsum non
 est coloratum. Utraque vero terminatio est in corporibus inferioribus; et ideo
 omnia corpora inferiora sunt colorata.

Ad tertium dicendum quod differenter immutat coelum visum secundum
 305 actum lucidi et alia corpora inferiora, quoniam alia corpora immutant visum
 secundum actum lucidi per medium, scilicet aerem, prius in actu lucidum, id
 est prius actu illuminatum a lumine Solis vel ignis, sine quo aere actu prius
 illuminato non posset corpus hic inferius immutare sensum, id est gignere
 suam speciem in oculo. Coelum vero immutat visum secundum actum lucidi
 310 per medium lucidum...

Edidit Monika MANSFELD

279–280 Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima*, II, 7, 418a32 (*Translatio Jacobi Venetici*, ed. Decorte & Brams, ALDatabase): “Omnis enim color motivus est secundum actum lucidi, et hoc est ipsius natura”.

280 gignit] gignit (!) *ms.* 309 gignere] gignere (!) *ms.*