



Philosophy, the oldest superstition

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ABSTRACT

The article examines the history, essence, and current state of philosophy, based on the views of François Laruelle, the founder of non-philosophy, who believes that philosophy is the oldest superstition. The article is divided into five parts: Closure, Impossibility, Immanence, Vertigo of Immanence, and Spectral Dialectics. In the first section, titled Closure, the article discusses the origins of philosophy in ancient Greece, its assimilation into metaphysics, and the implications this has had for the fate of philosophy in the Western tradition. Additionally, the article raises questions about the essence of philosophy and the possibility of a non-metaphysical philosophy. The second section, titled Impossibility, explores the notion that it is impossible to conceive of anything truly distinct or foreign to philosophy, such as what might be considered transcendent or beyond it. The third section, Immanence, focuses on the transition of philosophy towards immanence, using the philosophies of Michel Henry, Gilles Deleuze, and Alain Badiou as examples. The fourth section, Vertigo of Immanence, explores the prospect of surpassing philosophy, drawing from Martin Heidegger's late philosophy (the phenomenology of the inapparent) and Laruelle's non-philosophy. Building on the preceding sections, the final part of the article suggests a way of conceiving contemporary thought as spectral dialectics, comprising three elements: spectral phenomenology, spectral theory, and spectral performativity.

KEYWORDS

immanence; transcendence; metaphysics; The Real; appearance; philosophy; non-philosophy; phenomenology of inapparent; spectral dialectics

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It was François Laruelle who coined the term “oldest superstition” to characterize philosophy (Laruelle, 2011: 123),¹ and developed the concept of non-philosophy. Since the 1990s, there has been a growing interest in Laruelle’s ideas, resulting in the translation of his works into English. Today, he is widely recognized as a significant voice in the contemporary discourse on the essence of philosophy. Laruelle’s stance on philosophy is unconventional and radical: he argues that philosophy can only be understood from the perspective of non-philosophy since philosophy, once rooted in its immanent framework, has reached its limit and has no future. Therefore, Laruelle advocates for a move away from philosophy towards non-philosophy. He provocatively positions himself alongside Plato, René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, Donatien Alphonse François de Sade, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Max Stirner, Edmund Husserl, Friedrich Nietzsche, Jacques Derrida, Martin Heidegger, and Gilles Deleuze, asserting that philosophy, like an insatiable beast, will always demand more unless it is restrained (Laruelle, 2005: 123). Before delving into Laruelle’s proposed rejection of philosophy, it may be useful to examine the discipline itself and explore how we can comprehend its current status, which may involve a dialectical approach to philosophy.

CLOSURE

Heidegger famously contends that the “Greek beginning” of philosophy “settles everything” in the history of being (*Sein*), which can be related to what we commonly recognize as the history of philosophy (Heidegger, 1976: 145). In Heidegger’s view, this decision ultimately gives shape to Western philosophy as metaphysics, leading to the equation of philosophy with metaphysics:

Philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks being as a whole — the world, man, God — with respect to Being, with respect to the belonging together of beings in Being. Metaphysics thinks beings as being in the manner of representational thinking which gives reasons (Heidegger, 1972: 55–56).

Typically, two philosophers are credited with contributing to the formation of philosophy as metaphysics: Parmenides and Plato. Parmenides claimed that there is an existence, which is identical with the One. According to him, it is possible to know this existence and express this knowledge. Plato formalized Parmenides’ expansive outlook on philosophy, providing it with a framework

¹ Although “philosophy” is commonly associated with Western philosophy, I contend that the term can also be used to describe Chinese or Indian philosophy. However, Western philosophy has a unique history and qualities that can be traced back to ancient Greece, warranting its customary application as a label.

that would endure for centuries to come. The horizon of philosophy that follows is founded on concepts like idea, identity, unity, foundation, and truth. Deleuze argues that Plato's philosophy represents the apex of certain developments within Greek philosophy, characterized by the subordination of difference — that which resists being thought in itself — to the categories of sameness, similarity, identity, and presence (Deleuze, 1995). Platonism decisively shapes Western philosophy into a metaphysics of presence, where the assumed and unconditioned foundation and horizon is a source of undifferentiated and identical presence as the beginning, basis, and source. This presence takes various forms in the history of philosophy, such as idea, substance, subjectivity, consciousness, and even the divine intellect. Philosophy seeks to retrieve this presence and render it expressible in language, thereby imposing a dictate upon what is diverse and non-identical, attempting to assimilate it into the same. Presence becomes the transcendental principle of Western philosophical thought, with the *telos* of philosophy from its Greek origins to the present day being the quest to regain and make presentable this presence. The rational and knowledgeable subject will pursue this *telos* in search of the ideal, objective, and truthful meaning. The transcendental principle of presence that was established in philosophy at its inception would also guarantee the persistence of philosophy by maintaining a link with its continuously postponed *telos*. What keeps philosophy thriving is precisely the inability to achieve this *telos*. According to Theodor W. Adorno: "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed" (Adorno, 1973: 3). He provides a scathing critique, suggesting that the history of philosophy is a series of failures: "Its history is one of permanent failure insofar as, terrorized by science, it would keep searching for tangibility" (Adorno, 1973: 153).

Philosophy can be viewed as a metaphysical undertaking centered on presence, which, despite critically dismantling and refuting the notion of attaining and restoring presence, remains unfeasible and, in the end, absurd. The above understanding of philosophy raises questions not only about the possibility of its end, but also about how to practice philosophy, and, most importantly, what it even is.

The negation of the possibility of presence does not automatically entail the possibility of any philosophy other than one founded on presence, or a philosophy outside of metaphysics, if it is still justifiable to use this term. One possible illustration of this situation could be found in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, which some may even consider to be anti-philosophy. According to Wittgenstein, metaphysical statements are linguistic absurdities resulting from an improper use of language, and the truths of metaphysics are therefore unspeakable. Wittgenstein's view is that if someone attempts to say something metaphysical, it is necessary to demonstrate to them that they have given no meaning to certain signs in their speech, which results in linguistic

absurdities. In the case of such statements, there are no standards of correctness for their metaphysical use, nor any evidence that can be considered as testimony in favor of or against them. The only legitimate task of philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, is to analyze and explain language use. The task of philosophy would be to “bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (Wittgenstein, 1958: 48). In section 464 of *Philosophical investigations* Wittgenstein contends that numerous metaphysical sentences are nothing more than “disguised nonsense”, which grammatical inquiry is meant to uncover. Wittgenstein posits that philosophy is not a cognitive discipline, but an analytical pursuit focused on achieving clarity through the elimination of conceptual confusion, the distinction between what can be thought and what cannot, and the recognition of what should remain “silent”.

Yet, is it not the case that every judgment inevitably involves an entanglement in metaphysics, or can philosophical discourse truly be disentangled from metaphysics, as Wittgenstein sought to accomplish? Can one make a statement that is no longer *a priori* involved in metaphysics by the presence in it of what Derrida calls the “minimum of idealization” that makes all identity possible? If such a statement is indeed possible, it would imply that the task of disentangling philosophy from metaphysics is inherently impossible, given the essential role played by the “minimum of idealization” that underpins all identity, and the linguistic moment inherent in conceptualization (Derrida, 1988: 190).

There is no sense in doing without the concepts in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language — no syntax, no lexicon — which is foreign to this history [of metaphysics — author’s note]; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest (Derrida, 1978: 354).

Derrida contends that the inescapability of metaphysics within philosophy stems from the fact that our language is inherently structured by the presence of pre-existing linguistic elements. This characteristic would inevitably shape philosophical discourse and its metaphysical limitations, which, as Derrida maintains, manifest themselves as a persistent form of philosophy — one that is intrinsically linked to an insatiable, indestructible desire for presence, fueled by that which cannot be made present: “What gives it breath and necessity — what there is and what remains thus to be thought — is that which is in the presence of the present does not present itself” (Derrida, 1994: 15). That which does not present itself in the presence of the present is difference, the unredactable game of signifiers without a transcendental signified, but its trace marks and relaunches all systems (Derrida, 1994: 15).

The closure of philosophy within metaphysics entails that philosophy cannot exceed the “other” without rejecting the constraints of its own metaphysical

rationality. As per Derrida's perspective, any attempt to think *against* metaphysics would simply amount to a perpetuation of what needs to be transcended — in other words, it would represent a continuation of metaphysics. In other words, a philosophy that is bound within the confines of metaphysics would be the sole viable manifestation of philosophy.

Re-evaluating the foundation of philosophy within the framework of metaphysics compels us to reassess both its potential standing and the manner in which it is exercised, an undertaking in which the insights of Heidegger and Derrida could prove instrumental. In *Being and time* (1927), Heidegger introduces the concept of dismantling traditional ontology as a means of creating space for primordial experiences and, in turn, re-examining the question of being — which, according to him, has been neglected within philosophy. Years later, Heidegger would release *The end of philosophy and the task of thinking* (Heidegger, 1972), in which he advocates for the transcendence of philosophy as metaphysics in the pursuit of non-concealment. Derrida's work, which can be seen as a continuation of Heidegger's ideas regarding the presence of metaphysics in philosophy and the need for its dismantling, aims to critically deconstruct philosophical discourse by exposing its metaphysical aporia, all without entertaining the notion of transcending philosophy in its only possible form — that of metaphysics. Derrida makes a distinction between the closure of philosophy (*clôture*) within metaphysics and the end of philosophy (*fin*). Derrida argues that philosophy, as a system enclosed in metaphysics, can potentially persist indefinitely. This is because philosophy can still reconstruct itself, since every act of transgression “[gives] us a hold on the closure of — within its closure” (Derrida, 1981: 12).

I try to keep myself at the limit of philosophical discourse. I say limit and not death, for I do not at all believe in what today is so easily called the death of philosophy (nor, moreover, in the simple death of whatever—the book, man, or god, especially since, as we all know, what is dead wields a very specific power) (Derrida, 1981: 6).

IMPOSSIBILITY

The notion of the “eternal continuity” of philosophy, as Derrida argues, suggests that its transformations and transgressions only confirm its confinement within metaphysical boundaries. However, this does not fully address the discourse of philosophy, but rather sustains and justifies its further existence. As Adorno puts it: “The further fact that there is no way to get out of thinking points to the support found in nonidentity — to the very support which thought, by its own forms, seeks and expresses as much as it denies it” (Adorno, 1973: 181). In the *Preface to The phenomenology of spirit* — Hegel postulated the need to

bring back a sense of seriousness to philosophy: “Philosophizing should again be made a serious business” (Hegel, 1977: 41). But what would be the serious business of philosophy in Hegel’s view? As he puts it: “To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowing—that is what I have set myself to do” (Hegel, 1977: 3). Hegel is making a reference to Aristotle’s views in *Metaphysics*, wherein philosophy is regarded as the quest for the fundamental principles and causes of reality, thereby serving as a possible attestation to the perpetual recurrence of metaphysical thinking in philosophical discourse. Adorno notes, however, that the history of philosophy is “one of permanent failure insofar as, terrorized by science, it would keep searching for tangibility” (Adorno, 1973: 109).

Philosophy has been, and probably continues to be, terrorized by science. Adorno’s assessment of the history of philosophy as a series of failures is a contentious one. By criticizing its metaphysical foundation, philosophy encounters a problem: it must maintain the seriousness of thought and knowledge that Aristotle and Hegel have spoken of, while also recognizing the primacy of non-identity and difference. This is how Adorno understands the relationship between philosophy and science:

It has earned the positivists’ criticism by claiming to have a scientific approach — a claim rejected by science; but these critics are wrong when they confront philosophy with unphilosophical criteria as soon as these criteria are even slightly in line with the philosophical idea. Philosophy will not dispense with truth, however, but will illuminate the narrowness of scientific truth. The determinant of its suspended state is that even while keeping its distance from the verifying type of cognition it is not noncommittal — that the life it leads has a stringency of its own. Philosophy seeks stringency in that which it is not, in its opposite, and in the reflection on what, with a poor sort of naïveté, is viewed as binding by positive cognition (Adorno, 1973: 109).

Philosophy distinguishes itself from science by not conforming to the latter’s criteria for scientific rigor, which cannot and should not be applied to philosophy. Nevertheless, philosophy leads its own rigorous life, as Adorno asserts, paradoxically seeking exactness in science — an impossible task — while subjecting science to criticism for its immanent limitations. Adorno characterizes the situation of philosophy as a state of suspension or unsettledness (*Schwebendes*):

Philosophy is neither a science nor the “cogitative poetry” (*Gedankendichtung*) to which positivists would degrade it in a stupid oxymoron. It is a form transmitted to those which differ from it as well as distinguished from them. Its suspended state is nothing but the expression of its inexpressibility (Adorno, 1973: 109).

This brings us to a second crucial understanding of philosophy: not only would it be linked to metaphysics, but it might always aspire to conceive the

impossible, for it could have a built-in transcendence towards what is distinct from it — something that lies beyond its conceptual framework and is ineffable, either ultimately or within a specific historical context of philosophy (Gutting, 2011: 185). It is possible to comprehend the history of philosophy as the history of attempting to conceive the inconceivable. Within this historical context, it is possible to differentiate at least two distinct philosophical attitudes. The first attitude would involve absolute skepticism regarding the ability of philosophy to surpass the primary and irreducible impossibility of conceptually comprehending that which exceeds conceptuality. The second attitude is characterized by relative skepticism, where historically determined conceptual limitations and impossibilities are overcome through the development of new concepts. The views of Adorno and Derrida exemplify the first attitude, but one could also include the philosophies of Emmanuel Lévinas or Jean-Luc Marion in this category. Michel Foucault, Deleuze, and Badiou are examples of the second attitude. It is at this point that it is impossible to ignore Hegel's view of philosophy as a process in which the contradictions of a given historical moment are transcended and overcome in the next stage, leading to the attainment of absolute knowledge free from them. This implies that Hegel rejects the possibility of being trapped in the insurmountable core or immanent impossibility of philosophy. After Hegel, philosophy appears to be confronted with a choice between rejecting his totalizing vision of philosophy (as seen in the views of Adorno, Derrida, Laruelle) or some form of reference to it through a mode of thinking that perceives philosophy as a conceptual evolution, accomplished by the development of new concepts, but denies the possibility of a dialectical moment of culminating in absolute knowledge and ending the process (e.g. Deleuze, Slavoj Žižek). The distinction between these two attitudes can also be observed in the philosophy of immanence trend, which includes prominent figures of continental philosophy such as Deleuze, Henry, Badiou, and Laruelle. This trend seems crucial for understanding the contemporary situation of philosophy. By rejecting transcendence, dualisms, and concepts of the “two worlds”, the philosophers of immanence programmatically make it the only object of philosophy:

Although it is always possible to invoke a transcendent that falls outside the plane of immanence, or that attributes immanence to itself, all transcendence is constituted solely in the flow of immanent consciousness that belongs to this plane. Transcendence is always a product of immanence (Deleuze, 2001: 30–31).

Simultaneously, they also engage with various scientific disciplines (such as mathematics in Badiou's philosophy), which fundamentally re-evaluates the role of philosophy, revitalizes it, and seems to offer novel avenues for the future (Mullarkey, 2006: 2).

IMMANENCE

Deleuze, who considered Baruch Spinoza as a precursor of immanence thinking, posits that the question of immanence becomes significant in contemporary philosophy when phenomenology comes face to face with metaphysics (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). Phenomenology, as Husserl postulated in his work *Logical investigations* — aimed to study the field of experience without any preconceptions or assumptions (*epoche*), which required a certain detachment from the philosophical tradition. Husserl's final reduction, which traces the genesis of time, leads him to the concept of an absolute and anonymous flow of impressions, a pure dynamic of primary matter (*Urbyle*) (Husserl, 2006). This refers to the level of passivity of the primary flow of impressions, which exists outside of time and represents a level of immanence beyond time itself. Husserl says that we lack words to express all this (Husserl, 1989: 429). Thus, we have reached the limit of Husserl's phenomenology, at the threshold of the emergence of presence and subjectivity. Husserl's concept of *Urbyle* serves as the foundation for the experience of subjectivity, which then shapes it into intentional forms.

Michel Henry takes Husserl's phenomenology to the extreme, turning it into a phenomenology that is purely focused on immanence. He interprets immanence as a self-awakening, self-disclosure (*auto-apparaître*), enabling him to escape from infinite regress. Henry materializes Husserl's phenomenology by eliminating the structure of intentionality along with its layer *eidōs*, reducing it to an unintentional process of self-revelation. "In the essence there is nothing transcendent" says Henry (Henry, 1973: 283). He also refers to it as Life or essence: "When nothing of the other any longer subsists, the essence remains alone with itself" (Henry, 1973: 284). Because intentionality is linked to the general perception of visibility (or representation), this non-intentional self-giving is already invisible. In other words, the process that allows things to appear is invisible. Simultaneously, Henry argues that Life experiences its own self-activated existence and represents itself through an arousal that is accessible to the living body (*la chair*) in the specific experience of pathos. Henry argues that in the experience of pathos, when we make an *epoche* of the world, all that is familiar and ordinary disappears and we are left with a non-conceptual, affective experience of invisible immanence (Henry, 1973: 549). Henry characterizes this presence as a kind of pre-reflective self-giveness, which precedes any polarization between subject and object. It is a presence that already contains within itself the dualism between subject and object.

Therefore, Henry proposes his own version of the philosophy of the invisible. However, what is invisible manifests itself and becomes available to us through affective experience during the *epoche* of the world. According to Henry, there

is ultimately only one dimension, which he identifies as immanence, and he regards it as divine.

A crucial issue emerges whether Henry's proposal of a philosophy of self-referential, divine immanence, experienced invisibly, exceeds the boundaries of phenomenology as the study and explanation of visible phenomena. Henry's departure from the ontological or phenomenological structure of experience is so profound that what is left after this reduction can be conceived of as a vacuous feeling in which everything appears to dissolve into an encounter with an unseen and ineffable immanence. Dominique Janicaud has characterized this philosophy as an instance of the "theological turn" that French phenomenology has undergone. This is how he describes it: "The structure of immanence, then is its pure auto-reference. Let us underline, though, that this is not a structure: it is a tautological interiority" (Janicaud, 2000a: 73). Therefore, it appears that Henry reaches an extreme level of immanence in his philosophy that is difficult to bear, yet it can still be experienced affectively, beyond concepts. This level of immanence can even be linked to a vitalistic or soteriological moment, considering the theological tendencies of his ideas. In this sense, Henry's philosophy can be considered an extreme version of the philosophy of immanence. This extremism lies in his highly affective and qualitative approach to immanence (Mullarkey, 2006: 189).

The philosophy of Alain Badiou would represent the other extreme — highly quantitative. In the *Introduction to Being and event* Badiou proposes that his contribution to the transcendence of the "closure of metaphysics" will be the merging of three anti-metaphysical areas of thought into a cohesive totality: Heidegger revisited the question of Western ontology, while analytical philosophy engaged with the insights of Cantor's theory of multiplicity and the Lacanian theory of subjectivity (Badiou, 2005: 2–3). According to Badiou, "philosophy is not centred on ontology—which exists as a separate and exact discipline—rather, it circulates between this ontology (thus, mathematics), the modern theories of the subject and its own history" (Badiou, 2005: 3). Badiou posits that mathematics, rather than philosophy, provides the only possible language for ontology itself. Specifically, he advocates for the Cantorean theory of multiplicity. Through subtractive analyses, all contingent qualities and determinations of existence are eliminated, leaving behind only "the multiple without any other predicate than its multiplicity" (Badiou, 2005: 28). However, this multiplicity is inconsistent since it does not undergo any unification and is therefore incalculable. A plurality is what being ultimately reduces itself to, so that it can be said to "be" nothing in a certain sense. Badiou presents another argument in favor of treating ontology mathematically, which is that the equivalence of being and one/unity, the foundation of traditional ontology, cannot be sustained in the light of the theory of multiplicity. The concept of "one" cannot be understood as something that exists in

itself, but rather as something that is merely counted or that counts-for-one (Badiou, 2005: 23). Pure existence devoid of any determinate qualities and seen as an incoherent plurality is ultimately equivalent to nothingness, a void that encompasses the whole. Badiou's application of mathematics to ontology leads to the conclusion that pure existence is infinite because it cannot be confined within the horizon of One, which itself does not exist. The theory of multiplicity also leads to an excess of sorts, as it permits the mathematical formalization of the redundancy of every set in relation to itself, which Badiou refers to as the "point of excess" theory (Badiou, 2005: 84). This, in turn, enables him to explore the realm of contemplating change and the idea of the Event as a way of understanding history. Badiou identifies four areas where the Event manifests itself as a rupture with the prevailing state of affairs, which represents a certain stable configuration of counted elements. These include politics, science, art and love. Badiou identifies four domains as the generic conditions of philosophy, where truths emerge as a generic description of the situations of existence. Through its subtractive operations on these domains, philosophy creates a discourse that combines these distinct "procedures of truth". Badiou understands truth as "infinite determination of an indiscernible of the situation" (Badiou 2005: 397), created by an entity that forms "hypotheses about the truth" (Badiou, 2005: 399). A subject without foundation, or rather a certain configuration of the situation when they are "faithful to the truth", and it is a matter of their decision, may bring about a radical change in the situation that occurs in the Event. The Event, by its very nature, is unpredictable, as it emerges from "the edge of the void".

In his subsequent significant work *Logics of worlds*, Badiou aims to depict the transcendental framework of their manifestation through the amalgamation of the theory of pure plurality's existence with the category of theory logic he elaborated in *Being and event* (Badiou, 2009). Badiou believes that there is a correspondence between the ontological and logical composition of every pure plurality. Badiou asserts that, like in mathematics where set theory and categorical logic are distinct, being and its appearance are separate entities. Nevertheless, Badiou contends that it is possible to attain an intelligibility that goes beyond the subject, which pertains to the transition from the transcendental synthesis of appearance to the real synthesis of pure multiplicity (Badiou, 2009: 289–290). This structure would precede any subjective perception of the world.

Many scholars consider Badiou's philosophy to be a contemporary iteration of Platonism. Badiou posits that ontology can only be expressed through mathematics, as it provides the language necessary to comprehend existence and ultimately gives rise to the materiality of the world. "Materialist dialectic is an ideology of immanence", says Badiou in *Logics of worlds* (Badiou, 2009: 10). Badiou's philosophy is intrinsically opposed to Kantianism, as it

seeks to overcome the limitations imposed by Kant's ideas, striving for an objective and transcendental logic that explains the emergence of worlds. As a result, Badiou's philosophy is aligned with the movement of "speculative realism" (along with figures such as Quentin Meillassoux, Ray Brassier, and Graham Harman), which similarly seeks to move beyond Kant's "correlationism".

While Badiou's philosophy relies heavily on mathematical concepts and represents one extreme approach to immanence, Deleuze's philosophy of immanence takes an intermediate position between Badiou's approach and Henry's affective approach (Mullarkey, 2006: 189). And so in *What is philosophy?* Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue that "philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 2). Concepts cannot be deduced:

Concepts are centers of vibrations, each in itself and every one in relation to all the others. This is why they all resonate rather than cohere or correspond with each other. There is no reason why concepts should cohere (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 23).

Concepts occupy the plane of immanence. This plane is "like a desert that concepts populate" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 36). The text *What is philosophy?* posits that philosophy comprises the dual activity of creating new concepts and delimiting the plane, with the concept representing the outset of philosophical inquiry and the plane serving to substantiate and establish it. The development of philosophy occurs through the creation or delineation of the plane of immanence. Philosophy's predicament lies in achieving coherence while simultaneously navigating the vastness of infinity, which threatens to engulf and shatter all coherence due to the destructive and disordered nature of chaos. The plane of immanence is also the plane of "radical empiricism". Deleuze's 1968 work *Expressionism in philosophy: Spinoza* explores the paradox of expression or manifestation and the essence of that which becomes manifest. The plane of immanence is the realm of exposure, within which the sense (*sens*) is manifested. Immanence's complete manifestation is expressed through difference: through repeated manifestations, differentiation is created within a horizon that encompasses virtuality and actuality as its two dimensions. The examination of this process is the concern of transcendental empiricism, which is essentially synonymous with Deleuze's philosophy. In his later works, Deleuze delineates both the scope of the field of study and the studies themselves as follows:

What is a transcendental field? It can be distinguished from experience in that it doesn't refer to an object or belong to a subject (empirical representation). It appears therefore as a pure stream of subjective consciousness, a pre-reflexive impersonal consciousness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without me a self. It may seem curious that the transcendental be defined by such direct givens: we will speak of

transcendental empiricism in contrast to everything that makes up the world of the subject and the object. There is something wild and powerful in this transcendental empiricism. [...] Must we then define the transcendental field by a pure immediate consciousness with neither an object nor self, as a movement that neither begins nor ends? (Deleuze, 2001: 25–26).

Towards the end of *What is philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari offer a definitive definition of transcendental empiricism as “pure contemplation without a concept” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 239). There are always two possible interpretations of vitalism: the first concerns action without essence, while the second pertains to potentiality without action, which manifests itself as pure inner feeling. The resemblance to Henry’s notion of immanence is not coincidental, as both Henry and Deleuze, who are vitalists seeking to conceive immanence, share this similarity. The second interpretation of vitalism, which involves potentiality without action and pure inner feeling, would be associated with the notion of pure contemplation without knowledge: “The second interpretation seems to us more convincing, because the relation of preservation is always referred to action or even movement, and appears as pure contemplation without concept or object” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 239). As such, if immanence is viewed as potentiality, then it would manifest itself as pure contemplation.

Deleuze posits that we can only speak of the plan of immanence when “immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself” (Deleuze, 2001: 27). Immanence is also that which cannot be conceptualized within any conceivable plane:

The plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nontought within thought. It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that does not succeed in thinking it. It is the most intimate within thought and yet the absolute outside—an outside more distant than any external world because it is an inside deeper than any internal world. [...] Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 59).

Deleuze recorded his final and, arguably, most significant meanings on immanence in his last text, which was published shortly before his death:


We will say of pure immanence that is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it complete power, complete bliss (Deleuze, 2001: 27).

Giorgio Agamben in his essay entitled *The absolute immanence* (1996) presents an interpretation of this passage (Agamben, 1999). Agamben begins by

citing Deleuze's note on Foucault, which suggests that Deleuze conceived of life as an immanence that yearns for itself (Agamben, 1999: 240). Nonetheless, Agamben contends that Deleuze did not perceive desire as something that arises from a sense of deficiency or any other similar concept. The question then arises: how can we conceive of a desire that remains immanent in and of itself, and which constitutes an immanent cause? In what way can we conceive of absolute immanence as a type of desire?

Agamben addresses these queries by invoking the perspectives of Aristotle and Spinoza on life, as found in *De anima* and *Cogitativa metaphysica*, respectively. He closely scrutinizes these viewpoints, including an examination of the etymology of the Greek verb *trephein*, which Aristotle employs when reflecting on the role of the vegetative soul. Agamben's in-depth analysis leads him to the conclusion that the vegetative soul's function of nourishing and giving life, as described by Aristotle in *De anima* should be understood as enabling the being to attain the state it desires, or "allowing to be". This idea, in turn, aligns with Spinoza's notion of life as "the force by which the thing persists in its being" (Agamben, 1999: 52). According to Agamben, the potentiality that comprises life is identified with the desire to preserve one's own being. This desire, in turn, characterizes life as a form of absolute immanence in the views of both Spinoza and Deleuze. Agamben also notes that this understanding allows for a better comprehension of Deleuze's assertion that life "is power and complete bliss". In other words, life, as pure potentiality, lacks nothing and constitutes the self-desire to be oneself, akin to Spinoza's understanding of being, and this is why Deleuze describes it as both power and complete bliss, as Agamben explains. "A life contains only virtuals", says Deleuze (Deleuze, 2001: 31). "All nourishment, all letting be is blessed and rejoices in itself" (Agamben, 1999: 237). In other words, this state of bliss refers to the movement of the immanent cause itself, representing its culmination and the ultimate bliss that, as Spinoza believed, a person could achieve. Beatitude is the movement of absolute immanence (Agamben, 1999: 238).

In the final section of his *Absolute immanence*, Agamben discusses the perspectives for philosophy. In this essay, Agamben also refers to the figure of Foucault and his last text *Life: Experience and science*, in which Foucault presents a pessimistic view that the potentiality of life is error and that humans are condemned to a life of error and untruth (Foucault, 1994: 774). Agamben's reflection on the future of philosophy involves incorporating both the biopolitical perspective of Foucault and the vitalist perspective of Deleuze into a new philosophy of life. He believes that the emergence of this new philosophy of life in contemporary thought is connected with the philosophy of immanence, which he sees as both an acquisition of a certain heritage and a task for the future. For better orientation in this task, Agamben attaches the following diagram to the text (Agamben, 1999: 239):



Agamben argues that the Greek ideals of *theoria* and the contemplative life can be transposed onto the new plane of immanence, specifically to the realm of pure contemplation, thus offering a possibility of sanctifying modern life (Agamben, 1999: 242).

According to Badiou, Deleuze's philosophy is not entirely free from transcendence because he cannot conceive of a "multiplicity without one". In Badiou's view, Deleuze relies on the concepts of oneness and the uniqueness of being, which ultimately imply a kind of transcendence (Beaulieu, 2016). This discussion cannot be exhaustively addressed here, but the crux of the matter concerns whether it is possible to conceive of immanence without any introduction of transcendence. Badiou believes that his philosophy is devoid of any transcendent elements, although this assertion is a subject of debate. The concept of immanence, which pertains to the notion of being located within something, represents a *sensu stricto* factual reality. It exists inherently and independently of any subjective comprehension or apprehension. Consequently, any attempt to apprehend or interpret immanence would represent a transcendence of it, i.e., an external imposition of something extraneous or unnecessary to its intrinsic nature. This comprehension occurs through the use of language and its conceptual framework, including the language of abstract and mathematical formalization as in the case of Badiou's philosophy. However, regardless of the type of language employed, there is always an idealization that is inevitably present, as per Derrida's concept of a minimal idealization. According to Nietzsche and Heidegger, language is essentially imbued with metaphysical connotations. As a consequence, any conceptual definition of immanence would be extrinsic

to it and thus redundant, resulting in a division between immanence and the conceptualization of it, and leading to a bifurcation between immanence and transcendence. This division naturally prompts a consideration of the suitability of conceptualization to capture the essence of immanence. Nonetheless, the key issue lies in the fact that the very act of conceptualization appears to validate this cleavage, this disparity between immanence and the act of conceiving it. The resolution of this quandary concerning the fitness of conceptualization to portray immanence ultimately boils down to a decision that must be made by a philosopher working within the framework of philosophy.

In *What is philosophy?* Spinoza is described in the following terms:

Spinoza was the philosopher who knew full well that immanence was only immanent to itself and therefore that it was a plane traversed by movements of the infinite, filled with intensive ordinates. He is therefore the prince of philosophers. Perhaps he is the only philosopher never to have compromised with transcendence and to have hunted it down everywhere. [...] He discovered that freedom exists only within immanence. He fulfilled philosophy because he satisfied its pre-philosophical presuppositions. [...] Spinoza is the vertigo of immanence from which so many philosophers try in vain to escape. Will we ever be mature enough for a Spinozist inspiration? (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 48)

VERTIGO OF IMMANENCE

According to Laruelle, Deleuze's view of "absolute" or "pure" immanence lacks radicality. In his view, a more radical perspective on immanence would involve acknowledging it as "the One" or "the Real", with an axiomatic definition that describes it as indivisible, absolutely independent, completely indifferent, and unshakable in the face of conceptual transcendence or understanding (James, 2012: 162). According to Laruelle, the concept of the One goes beyond any possible conceptualization, but it does not fall under the traditional understanding of transcendence. He argues that the One has a completely positive content, and that substance is the One as Indivisible (Laruelle, 1986: 170). The One refers to a radical indifference to Unity that is commonly addressed in philosophical discourse (Laruelle, 1986: 27). The One would show complete indifference towards the fundamental binary opposition of philosophy — immanence/transcendence. Laruelle posits that the One, as immanence, precedes all "philosophical decisions", and is entirely self-contained and autonomous. It is fundamentally opposed to all externalities and cannot be determined by any means. Philosophy cannot speak of it or make any claims about it. As he explains:

The One is characterized by a radical immanence that is completely free from any transcendence such as nothingness, cracks, or desire, which constitutes its essence or reality. Immanence precedes any performance (Laruelle, 1991: 19).

The Real, therefore, is not accessible to philosophy. Laruelle understands philosophy in a structuralist way. He has identified a “Structural Rule of Philosophical Decision” that operates in every philosophy. The rule is that philosophy is always founded on the dyad of immanence and transcendence. The division of immanence/transcendence is created by conceptual transcendence to blend immanence and transcendence, and eventually amalgamate them into the unity of a higher order. The constant configuration of philosophy based on the immanence/transcendence dyad allows for its self-validation and assertion of universalism, independence, and superiority over all other domains of knowledge. When philosophy fails to adapt the Real to its conceptual requirements, it disavows anything that cannot be conceived by it.

These observations on the structure of philosophy lead Laruelle to the concept of non-philosophy. Laruelle’s analysis of the structure of philosophy led him to develop the idea of non-philosophy, which is not a mere lack or rejection of philosophy, but rather an alternative practice founded on a different basis. As Laruelle points out, the relationship between philosophy and non-philosophy would bear a resemblance to the relationship between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry. The One is embraced by non-philosophy as the exclusive goal of its unitive action, but this action no longer relies on the framework of philosophy proper. The implication is that non-philosophy would constitute a type of knowledge that is not dependent on any operations on the Real, and that does not seek to represent it. Instead, this knowledge would be determined by the Real, but in a way that differs from the modes of knowledge production that philosophy employs. But how would this even be possible?

The opposite of the philosophical decision that creates the dichotomy of immanence/transcendence is referred to as Vision-in-One, according to Laruelle. To grasp Laruelle’s concept of Vision-in-One, it is crucial to understand that the One is transcendent in the ultimate sense.

Unlike Kant’s transcendental structures, Laruelle’s transcendental immanence is entirely shorn of transcendence while at the same time always being that which conditions transcendence in the last instance. This is a one-way street of causality whereby everything which «is» is necessarily “in” in immanence and caused by it, but never able to exert any reverse causal determining force on the indivisible and autonomous One of immanence. All this follows rigorously as a deduction from the axiom of indivisibility which organizes the vision-in-One (James, 2012: 169–170).

Laruelle calls this conditioning of everything by the One “determination-in-the-last-instance”. We now understand that Vision-in-One entails perceiving the “determination-in-the-last-instance” of all by the One. A form of ultra-realism is implied here, which maintains its character as realism despite acknowledging the Real as an immanence that cannot be known (James,

2012: 171). Laruelle derives the thesis of the equivalence of different philosophies from this ultra-realism, as none of them can have access to the Real. The philosophies are contingent, but ultimately determined by the Real. In other words, non-philosophy cannot directly access the One, which is completely autonomous and indifferent to thought. Therefore, it requires philosophy as a material to work with, in order to access and manipulate the structures that philosophy has produced (James, 2012: 175). In order to construct its own discourse, non-philosophy relies on philosophy for supplying the necessary material. Laruelle believes that the task of non-philosophy is to intercept the material provided by philosophy, transform it, and free it from transcendence by placing it back in the immanence of the Real. Laruelle suggests that the transformation of philosophy by non-philosophy involves a process of “dualization” in which the material of philosophy is split into two components, emphasizing the dichotomy between the Real and thought. At a later point in his intellectual evolution, Laruelle also uses the term “cloning the Real” in this context. The process of “cloning the Real” involves dualizing the material of philosophy, removing transcendence from it, and placing it within a relationship with the Real on a transcendental level. At this point in Laruelle’s thought, the transcendental is not the Real itself, but rather in a relationship of radical duality with it. Therefore, Laruelle refers to the operation of Real cloning. According to Laruelle, an adept of non-philosophy with the “power of thought” would be the operator of this process. The power of thought can be understood as an attitude of maintaining the immanence of the Real through Vision-in-One (Laruelle, 2013: 54). The structure of non-philosophy would thus be as follows (James, 2012: 177):

Real (One/Absolute Autonomy) → **Transcendental** (clone/radical split)
 ↔ **Transcendent** (philosophical dyad/mixture)

Laruelle’s view is that the success of non-philosophy is contingent on the development of distinct forms of discourse and genres, which are not employed by philosophy. By suspending the totalizing discourse of philosophy, non-philosophy allows for the emergence of new forms of thought and discourse that are not bound by philosophical conventions. This opens up the possibility for a democratic production of thought that cannot be evaluated by philosophy. Laruelle proposes the exploration of novel modes of communication, fresh approaches, innovative writing styles, and alternative prospects for this distinct manner of thinking. *Non-standard philosophy: generic, quantum, philo-fiction* (Laruelle, 2010) not only develops the science of the possibilities of invention, but also makes an appeal to fight against all norms that restrict invention and limit what is possible (James, 2012: 178). The limitations referred to would also include the contemporary linguistic paradigm or textualism. Non-philosophy

aims to liberate what is possible through transformative invention, with the goal of unlocking the potential worlds of the future.

In 1964, Heidegger's lecture entitled *The end of philosophy and the task of thinking* (Heidegger, 1972) was published. The essay presents reflections on philosophy as metaphysics and its ending, followed by a discussion on the *unconcealment* and necessity of its experience for human beings. Heidegger also says that philosophy "knows nothing of the opening" (Heidegger, 1972: 67). During the last seminar attended by Heidegger in September 1973, held in Zähringen near Freiburg, he discussed the possibility and practice of an "inapparent phenomenology" (*Phänomenologie des Unschäinbaren*).

Heidegger sets the goal of phenomenological research at the beginning of *Being and time* by stating that it requires the destruction of the ancient ontology, which would then provide access to primordial experiences. This rejection of philosophical tradition should open up the field of phenomenological research. What would be the procedure and outcomes if such a thing were achievable? In the end, we reach the issue of whether it is possible or impossible to go beyond metaphysics. Husserl defined the program of phenomenology with the call to go "back to the things themselves". This cry can be seen as a summary of the entire program of the phenomenological movement, which is mainly concerned with the study of experience and its source sphere. One could interpret Heidegger's philosophy as an extreme and thorough form of this investigation, simultaneously reexamining the principles and evolution of Western philosophy. It appears that dismantling the metaphysical structure of experience creates an opportunity for experiencing and understanding it in a non-metaphysical manner. Referring to the phrase *Es gibt*, Heidegger argues that being and time are not something that "is" but rather: "It" gives being and time. Heidegger believes that in this "It" that gives being and time speaks the enowning (*Ereignis*). Being is a term that refers to presence, it allows for this presence to be discovered and brought to light (*Anwesenlassen*). In the perspective of the enowning, being is thought of as its gift or giving (*Gabe*). *Ereignis* is untemporal, it does not reveal itself or transmit itself, but instead is withdrawn. It cannot be inferred from anything else and cannot be explained by any pre-existing concepts or frameworks. *Ereignis* cannot be fully represented or articulated through language or any other means of representation. It is beyond what can be expressed or captured in any form. If metaphysics is indeed the forgetting of being, the concealment and withdrawal of what gives being, then the entrance of Heideggerian thought into the enowning (*Erdenken des Ereignis*) would signify the end of that withdrawal. Heidegger says that with the awakening into enowning, the oblivion of being is negated, although metaphysics would like to continue to exist (Heidegger, 1972: 41). Heidegger declares the end of metaphysics and goes even further to proclaim the end of philosophy. In 1969, at a seminar in Le Thor, he said that nothing Greek was thought of in the enowning (Heidegger, 2003: 61).

At the seminar in Zähringen, Heidegger analyzed several passages, including Parmenides 1, 5, and 8, and emphasized that the realm of unconcealment is a fundamental dimension of experience that is more essential than conscious being. In Heidegger's interpretation, the passages from Parmenides 1, 5, 8 speak about the primordial experience of *aletheia* occurring before any distinction between theory and practice. The heart or center of this experience is the presenting or becoming present. According to Heidegger, *aletheia* is not a mere empty void or abyss, but rather an opening that contains the entirety of being present (Heidegger, 2003: 80). The tautological nature of Parmenides thinking, as interpreted by Heidegger, lies in its expression of the presence of presence. This expression is seen by Heidegger as conveying the source meaning of phenomenology. Heidegger states at the end of the seminar: "Thus understood, phenomenology is a path that leads away to come before... and it lets that before which it is led to show itself. This phenomenology is the phenomenology of the inapparent" (Heidegger, 2003: 80).

Jason W. Alvis identifies three possible interpretations of the concept of the inconspicuous in Heidegger's thought (Alvis, 2018):

1. The quality of inconspicuousness would be intrinsic to all appearance and being. The *a priori* condition of what is visible can never be brought to appearance, but what is inapparent (*unscheinbar*) is always intertwined with what is manifest (*scheinbar*) as an active feature or form of the "concealment" of phenomena, which would be an inherent feature of phenomenology. Invisibility would thus be inherent in every phenomenon, and each phenomenon would hold the potential to manifest being through its inconspicuousness. Phenomenology of the inapparent would be a kind of general, special "tuning" to the inconspicuous, a method of understanding being that takes into account its inconspicuousness, which paradoxically provides access to it. (There is a similarity between this and Laruelle's idea of One and Vision-in-One.)
2. The phenomenology of the inapparent can either refer to the investigation of specific moments or levels of the inconspicuous in experience, or to a study aimed at extracting different modes of manifestation of this phenomenon through phenomenological reflection, which may involve observing various everyday phenomena over a certain period of time. Alternatively, it could involve being mindful and focused on the manifestation of the inconspicuous. Janicaud claims that this would represent a "novel form of thinking" that Heidegger developed in Zähringen (Janicaud, 2005: 75).
3. The phenomenology of the inapparent would involve focusing on phenomena that go beyond the visible/invisible distinction, yet are still somehow present and active.

According to Janicaud, the phenomenology of the inapparent would entail a training of perception to become attuned to the very essence of phenomenality,

resulting in a phenomenology of proximity (Janicaud, 2005). However, Heidegger did not provide a more detailed explanation of the concept of the phenomenology of the inapparent, and this proposal itself poses a challenge for phenomenology.

Towards the end of his life, Heidegger's notes reveal two additional concepts that may have represented his ultimate understanding of phenomenology. These terms, *tautophasis* and *phenomenophasis*, can be translated respectively as "self-manifestation" and "phenomeno-manifestion", respectively (McNeill, 2020: 130, 212). In Heidegger's later conception, former phenomenology due to its close association with conceptual thinking, would no longer be the proper attitude that enables the experience of the unapparent in the appearance.

Can Heidegger's non-metaphysical *phenomenophasis* allow for the experience of contemplation, characterized by pure, non-dualistic subjectivity, luminous spatiality, and a unique cognitive moment that is limited and special, and not mediated by language or anything else?

In *Contributions to philosophy* Heidegger contends that moment (*Augenblick*) as the fundamental experience of being disclosure is essentially unutterable and cannot be conveyed through language. Is there a way to communicate this? There is, but it is only possible through the language of metaphysics because creating a new language "freed from relationships" is not feasible (Heidegger, 2012: 392). However, Heidegger's philosophy aims to transcend the subjectivist perspective by dismantling the metaphysical experience and expressing it through concepts such as being (*Sein*), beyng (*Seyn*), region (*Gegend*), openness (*Offene*), unconcealment (*aletheia*), nearness (*Nähe*) and enowning (*Ereignis*). At the same time, "the time of enowning" refers to a four-dimensional temporal experience, constituting the appropriate duration for the translucent attainment of the four-dimensional realm (Heidegger, 1972: 16–17). The fourth dimension functions as a way of holding the three dimensions separately while directing them towards one another in close vicinity (Heidegger, 1972: 14–15): "Time-space, as the unity of the originally temporalization and spatialization, is itself originally the site of the moment, and this site is the abyssal, essential temporality-spatiality for the openness of concealment, i.e., for the «there»" (Heidegger, 2012: 304). It is possible to refer to the phenomenology of the unapparent as embracing the arrival, being situated within (*Innestehen*) the appropriate domain of attunement, and leading us towards the four-dimensional time (Heidegger, 1972: 23). However, one of Heidegger's ultimate assertions is that the enowning is the most inconspicuous aspect within the inconspicuous (Heidegger, 1982: 128).

Heidegger wrote to Roger Mounier after a seminar in Zähringen, suggesting the practice of the phenomenology of the inapparent as a means to achieve phenomenological vision. (Heidegger, 1986: 417). Heidegger believed that phenomenological vision cannot be attained through reading books alone, but

rather through exercises inspired by his lecture titled *What is called thinking?*. Here is an excerpt from this lecture:

What must be thought about, turns away from man. It withdraws from him. But how can we have the least knowledge of something that withdraws from the beginning, how can we even give it a name? Whatever withdraws refuses arrival. But — withdrawing is not nothing. Withdrawal is an event (*Ereignis*) (Heidegger, 1968: 8–9).

Doesn't Heidegger's extreme phenomenism put an end to even thinking following the end of philosophy? Heidegger maintained that the fundamental shortcoming of his book *Being and time* was that he attempted to do too much too early. Can it be said that Heidegger's later ideas were also too much and too early? Perhaps, but it could probably be seen as a groundbreaking effort to engage in post-metaphysical thinking and to draw ultimate conclusions from phenomenology. Heidegger's conception of being, and particularly liberation (*Gelassenheit*) goes beyond the limits of phenomenological reduction and can be seen as a form of transgression from the ontic and conceptual realm of metaphysics to openness as a radiant sphere of immanence, which is liberated from its entanglements with those realms and allowed to exist on its own terms. The transformation of ordinary being into another can also be interpreted as an entry into the sphere of immanence, where the self-liberation of immanence itself takes place, which can be understood as a form of *tautophasis* of immanence.

SPECTRAL DIALECTICS

Late Heidegger says that metaphysics, presumably in its final stage, does not permit the emergence of another type of thinking, despite the fact that it *does* exist (Heidegger, 1972: 53–54). It's possible that Heidegger was referring to his own thinking, but we could also interpret the shift to non-philosophy in Laruelle as an example of this *other* kind of thinking that seeks to move beyond philosophy as metaphysics. One of the central problems in their thinking is the already *outside* of philosophy. The extreme nature of their perspectives raises significant doubts about the feasibility and essence of philosophy. Barbara Skarga once titled a collection of her essays *O filozofię bać się nie musimy* [No need to fear for philosophy], but isn't philosophy a problem in itself today (Skarga, 1999)? John Mullarkey concludes his book on post-continental philosophy (focusing on Deleuze, Henry, Badiou, Laruelle) with a chapter entitled *Thinking in diagrams*, which — in his view — represents an extension and transformation of the Agamben diagram discussed earlier, and in its essence, it embodies a realization of meta-philosophical diagrammatology. One way to interpret this is as a response to the question of how to practice philosophy in the present day (Mullarkey, 2006: 157–181). Ray Brassier maintains that

philosophy bears the irreparable trauma of cosmic extinction, and this trauma cannot be worked through, and for this reason philosophy will never be any medium of affirmation of the primal state of affairs, which would be emptiness, nor a source of its justification. Rather, he asserts that philosophy remains a tool of this cosmic lifelessness (Brassier, 2007: 239). According to him, in terms of nihilism, what we have witnessed so far is only the beginning.

Günter Figal argues that space fundamentally remains inconspicuous. He develops the phenomenology of space based on this recognition, mainly by referring to the views of Husserl and Heidegger (Figal, 2015). One can say that a tendency of “spatialization” is noticeable in contemporary philosophy. Contemporary philosophy has been exploring themes related to vision (as seen in the works of Heidegger and Laruelle) and spectrality (as in Derrida’s hauntology), which align with its own deontologization (as argued by Heidegger, Badiou, and the Real according to Jacques Lacan and Žižek). According to Badiou, Lacan’s anti-philosophical stance is necessary for philosophy’s revival. Badiou posits that in the present day, only a philosophy that is compatible with Lacan’s teachings can be viable (Badiou, 1999: 84). One can also observe that in contemporary philosophy, there is an interest in discussing potentialities and energy. Laruelle (Laruelle, 2010) and Žižek (Žižek, 2013) are examples of philosophers who incorporate quantum theory into their work.

Is it possible to integrate this modern way of thinking into a cohesive whole? While it may not be necessary or even possible, in the light of the previous discussion, it may be worthwhile to consider a dialectical approach. The proposed dialectic would be spectral in nature, as its focus would be on the spectrum as the foundation of all phenomena. Spectral dialectics could be divided into three parts: spectral phenomenology, spectral theory, and spectral performance. Spectral phenomenology would comprise all varieties of phenomenology, ranging from Heidegger’s phenomenology of the unapparent to Janicaud’s minimalist phenomenology (Janicaud, 2000b). Spectral theory would bring together philosophy, anti-philosophy, metaphilosophy, and non-philosophy into an unlikely unity. Spectral performance would include art, techniques for transforming experiences, invention, and philo-fiction.

According to Laruelle, the language used in philosophy fails to attain the Real (Laruelle, 1995: 177). Perhaps this is so, but the spectrum still displays itself.

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