



The four discourses of the logic of art — creating the artist's own language

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to transcribe Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytical theory of four discourses into a logic of art. The four discourses — the master's discourse, the hysteric's discourse, the analyst's discourse and the university discourse — are rewritten as the four discourses of the logic of art: the recipient's discourse, the artist's discourse, the discourse of the act of creation and the discourse of the artisan/formalist. The four algebraic Lacanian signs are substituted with counterparts from the realm of art. The interpretation of Lacan's theory is based on work of Lacanian thinkers, especially Slavoj Žižek and Jacques-Alain Miller. The article poses a question about how the artist, the recipient, the work of art and the artistic process are related to one another in several situations characteristic of artistic production in modernity. An important issue that is considered in the article is the artist's enjoyment accompanying the act of artistic creation — linked to the Lacanian concept of surplus *jouissance*. At stake is the problem of inventing the artist's own language. Moreover, the article is an attempt to conceptualise the instability of the phenomenon of the work of art and its reception. Author's aim is to develop a psychoanalytical and dynamic conception of artistic creation and the functioning of the work of art.

KEYWORDS

four discourses; Jacques Lacan; *jouissance*; artist; recipient; work of art; act of creation

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this text is to use Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytical theory of the four discourses to outline the logic of art and, more specifically, the logic of artistic creation — the creation of the artist's own language. One of the key concepts will be surplus enjoyment, Lacanian *jouissance* as *objet petit a*, which appears in the conception of the four discourses to be the force that drives their movement. However, *jouissance* sometimes can, or even should, be read as independent of the symbolic order, the order of language. The relation here is not that simple (Miller, 2020) and it can be the case that it is the non-linguistic element that enables the emergence of the artist's own artistic language.¹ My goal is to develop a dynamic conception of artistic creation — a specific mode of (mis)recognising oneself, or wandering, in language through the language of artistic expression — by outlining different phases of the artistic subject's relation to him or herself, their work and its reception.

In addition, I aim to show what in my view remains unnoticed: that during the production and consumption of art, the main actors of the artistic field occupy positions which are inevitably lost. Always located in a particular discourse, they speak from a different place than the one they seem to occupy.

LACAN'S THEORY OF FOUR DISCOURSES

The theory of four discourses was presented by Jacques Lacan during his seventeenth seminar, in the academic year 1969/70, and published in 1991 as *Le Séminaire Livre XVII: L'Envers de la psychanalyse*. The four discourses — the master's discourse, the hysteric's discourse, the analyst's discourse, and the university discourse — are four possible subjective positions (Žižek, 1998: 75). To describe them, the French psychoanalyst used four letters from his algebraic dictionary. These are:

S1 — master signifier

S2 — knowledge (*le savoir*)


\$ — divided subject

a — surplus *jouissance* (*objet petit a*)

These have been plotted on a quadruped diagram (the “quadripod”). It is formed out of four areas, successively filled with the above elements, always in

¹ The relation of *jouissance* to the symbolic is one of the key features of Lacanian theory. In general one could see the symbolic as a defence from *jouissance*, but at the same time *jouissance* is realised within the symbolic. Conceptualising *objet petit a* as surplus *jouissance* can be seen precisely as one of the moments of such entanglement of this problem in Lacan's *œuvre*. Later on, with the discovery of feminine *jouissance*, Lacan developed *jouissance* beyond discourse and the Other, *jouissance* which is not *objet petit a*.

the same order and resulting in four discourses, four permutations, out of rotation. To each area a specific function is attached (Lacan, 2007: 93):



In contrast to the four letters (*S1*, *S2*, *\$*, *a*), the four places (*agent*, *Other*, *production* and *truth*) remain unmoved. They are successively inhabited by the four letters so that each letter occupies a different position in each discourse. It's like turning a necklace made out of four beads.

TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FOUR DISCOURSES — BETWEEN HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

The various interpretations and attempts to use the theory of the four discourses oscillate between two readings which are not mutually exclusive, but rather alternative readings. One presents discourses as corresponding to specific moments in the historical process: the discourse of the master would correspond to the times of monarchy with a feudal social structure that was dying but still functioning. Then, with the emergence of capitalism, the modern university and, finally, with the 20th-century totalitarianisms, the university discourse emerged. The analyst's discourse would also be associated with the historical emergence of psychoanalysis, which Lacan himself saw as a historical phenomenon that had a beginning, as well as a predictable end (Lacan, 2013: 63–67). Hysterical discourse, as the most subversive, is a response to prevailing social relations and takes various historically determined forms. However, classical hysteria, which we can view as one of the conditions for the emergence of psychoanalysis, is also linked to a specific historical moment. Hysteria, from the moment of its emergence, became trans-historical at the same time corresponding to history itself (hysteria=history²). Such a “historicisation” of discourses is present in the works of Slavoj Žižek, although Jacques-Alain Miller also makes similar claims (Miller, 2006; Miller, 2014). Of course this application of the theory refers to discourses as social

² The possibility of such reading of hysteria as history was proposed by Slavoj Žižek in one of his lectures in the European Graduate School in the context of a reference to Miller. The very link of hysteria and history was made by Lacan himself with a term of *l'hystorisation* (*une histoire hystérisée* — hystericised history) in his *Préface à l'édition anglaise du Séminaire XI* (Lacan, 2001), which was rather focused on the individual history of the subject's hysteria as revealed during analysis. Žižek's theoretical gesture, on the other hand, seems to refer rather to historicised hysteria (*une hystérie historisée*) (Žižek, 2012).

bonds, even including descriptions of the social field itself and could be considered social theory.

The second reading — which seems more orthodox and can be related to Miller's work and other theoretician-analysts — is primarily a clinical reading: it views the four discourses as they are manifested in psychoanalysis as practice. From this angle, the analysand (the person undergoing psychoanalytic therapy) moves between discourses. Most often starting from the master's discourse, one goes through a process of hystericisation of the subject, to finally reach the position occupied fundamentally by the psychoanalyst — the analyst's discourse. The movement that takes place during the transition between discourses is crucial not only to progress with the analysis but also to the very formation of discourses as a certain theoretical whole as posited by Lacan, where it is the movement, by a quarter turn, that produces successive positions.

THE PLANE OF ART IN MODERNITY

It would be a mistake to overemphasise the division outlined above between the socio-historical and analytical use of discourses. The present text presupposes an interpretation of this division that takes its dynamic form as given, so is more connected to the analytical interpretation, however we also need to be able to study socio-cultural phenomena external to psychoanalysis — such as art. So, it is necessary to state the conditions for the use of the theory of the four discourses. If within Lacan's work itself, we have to deal with the discourses as bound and conditioned by history — moreover, the history of modernity — we must specify that we are talking here about the phenomenon of modern art. "Modern", but not in the formalist sense, but in terms of the specific social relations out of which artistic activity has emerged in modernity. It is about the way the artist, the work of art and the recipient function, a way that is only possible in modernity. It is related to bourgeois society: art as a commodity, but also art as entangled in the logic of symbolic capital, with the invention of public and private art institutions.

As I have sketched above, a specific subjective position can be adopted, depending on the social or analytical interpretation of discourses — i.e. whether in the social field or in the psychoanalytic room. We will inquire about four positions that can be taken towards the functioning of the work of art, its creation and reception, which, on the one hand, corresponds to the social sub-field that is the field of art, and, on the other hand, corresponds to the intimacy of the therapeutic situation that is a feature of the creative process. The proximity to analysis here may also be due to the fact that the text is focused more on the subject's individual relationship to artistic phenomena

than on interpreting the artistic field itself — for example, as one might, following Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1995). However, specific social relations focused on the phenomenon of art, those which Bourdieu has described, can be seen as a framework making such a movement of discourses possible. For the time being, let us assume that Bourdieu's theory of the field of art — as a theory of the modern functioning of the works of art, the artist, the recipient, and the institutions — would play the role of the big Other in the language of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Of course, according to Lacan's well-known statement, at this stage "there is no Other of the Other" (Lacan, 2006: 688): the modern field of art as the Other is one of many possible Others; it is in fact an Other, a set of signifiers attributed to this field. The positions of these signifiers is being established in relation to a chosen signifier which operates as a master signifier, since "a signifier is what represents the subject to another signifier" (Lacan, 2006: 694). This game of signifiers is treated here as a social relation within the field of art. A signifier marks a position one occupies in the field. Thus the four discourses of art and its four letters are a discursive logic inserted into a particular Other, operating analogously to psychoanalysis, which is as much a social phenomenon as the individual experience of the subject.

THE LOGIC OF ART

In order to rewrite this psychoanalytic discursive logic into the logic of the artistic value, I retain the four places occupied by *agent*, *Other*, *truth* and *production*. I make modifications to the four letters of the Lacanian algebra, however the correspondence between the original Lacanian letters and my proposition remains strong. One could say that these are their artistic counterparts:


- $S1$ — recipient
- $S2$ — artist-who-knows (*le savoir*)
- $\$$ — artist-who-doesn't-know (divided artist)
- a — *jouissance* of the act of creation

DISCOURSE OF THE MASTER = DISCOURSE OF THE RECIPIENT

Master's discourse:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} S1 & & S2 \\ \hline & \rightarrow & \\ \$ & & a \end{array}$$

Recipient's discourse:



We take as our starting point the discourse of the recipient, and thus we bind the master signifier in the logic of art not to the artist, who would seem to be the most significant actor here, but to the recipient³. For art without a recipient does not exist — it is the reception of art that consecrates the fact of its existence. Art outside its social practice would be devoid of any meaning. Just as “the Master’s gesture is the founding gesture of every social link” (Žižek, 1998: 77), so the gesture of the recipient conditions the emergence of the social phenomenon of art.

The recipient, as the master, is our first agent. The Other towards whom he is directed is the artist, who, in the Lacanian discourse of the master, represents knowledge — here, knowledge of the genesis of the work of art. But it is not the artist that the recipient cares about, but the artist’s work, of which intentions and meaning he wishes to understand. Ultimately, the enjoyment derived from the fact of creation will remain inaccessible to the recipient, even when consuming the work, whether in the gallery or even in the immediacy of purchase (a specific type of recipient-collector). Just as the master will never comprehend the slave’s work, even if he enjoys its results (Lacan, 2007: 97, 107, 197), the recipient will never be able to reach the intention that the work conceals, or the circumstances under which it was created. So, the place of the surplus, the residue that is the product of discourse and to which the agent of discourse ultimately has no access (Žižek, 1998: 78), in the discourse of the recipient is taken, analogously to the discourse of the master, as the surplus *jouissance*, which is, in this case, the *jouissance* of the act of creation. Lacan himself referred to the place of the product as “loss” (Lacan, 2007: 93), a point later made explicit by Žižek: “‘Production’ (the fourth term in the matrix of discourses) does not stand simply for the result of the discursive operation, but rather for its ‘indivisible remainder’, for the excess that resists being included in the discursive network (i.e., for what the discourse itself produces as the foreign body in its very heart)” (Žižek, 1998: 78).

The artist remains for the recipient the one who knows. Hence the insistent questioning of the artist by the recipient: “What is your work about?” The only thing the recipient can receive is his/her own interpretation, to be created on

³ I use the notion of the recipient as Bourdieu does, although it should be noted that since we are mostly dealing with visual arts here, the notion of the viewer would be also sufficient.

one's own. It is this that takes the place of the truth of this discourse. The truth of the recipient's discourse is that he or she, wanting to participate fully in the process of creating art, harbours the desire and at the same time the disposition, to become an artist, while also being one who does not know. Just as the place of truth is occupied in Lacanian discourse by a divided subject, one could say that the artist-who-doesn't-know also remains divided — torn by the fundamental question haunting creative act: "What to create and what for?"

The compatibility of the occupied symbolic position with the act of utterance (that defines the master's discourse) is possible in the discourse of the recipient precisely because he or she is a person who has not yet uttered in the sense of artistic expression (thing being what I mean by the artist's "own language"). The recipient is the only one who speaks here and now, without an object that belongs to him or her, without a work — only speech (the master's: "I am what I say") remains. The recipient has the privilege of judgment over the work of art, the work of the Other. The recipient intervenes in the field of art as the set of artists.

HYSTERICAL DISCOURSE = ARTIST'S DISCOURSE

Hysteric's discourse:

$$\frac{\$}{a} \rightarrow \frac{S1}{S2}$$

Artist's discourse:

$$\frac{\text{artist-who-does-not-know}}{\text{jouissance of the act of creation}} \rightarrow \frac{\text{recipient}}{\text{artist-who-knows}}$$

The subject, being in the master's discourse, must be hystericised in the process of analysis. At the same time, the master's discourse seems unsustainable in the long run. The unconscious desire of the recipient to become an artist too, the desire for full participation, as well as the truth of the necessity of one's own interpretation through a lack of access to the true intention of the artist and meaning of the work, opens up the possibility of committing the crime of performing a creative act on one's own. Thus, when we turn the master-recipient discourse a quarter turn clockwise, the agent becomes the artist — to be more precise, the artist-who-does-not-know. The artist addresses the recipient, who at this point occupies the position of the Other — the place

in the master's discourse which was occupied by knowledge, knowledge that is now presumed to have been produced. The artist, on the one hand, hopes that it is the recipient who will do the final work of interpretation. On the other hand, when an interpretation is offered, the artist can never fully agree with it. The artist turns out to be the hysteric *par excellence*, and the question of this discourse is: "Why are you telling me that my work is about what you are telling me it is about?" Thus, we are considering here the artist as a hysteric, and therefore a specific type of neurotic. Of course, it is always possible to track down artistic strategies of the psychotic or perverse kind. Let's just note here that the Lacanian structure of discourses also seems to be operating on the level of the neurotic structure.

Just as the hysteric seeks to undermine the master's position, so the artist who is exposed to the recipient and to the recipient's interpretation (for instance exhibiting a work of art). Although they hope the intention will be decoded, it usually resists all interpretation. It can never fully coincide with what he or she wanted to say — even if they actually know what their intentions were. The interpretation produced, since it occupies a place of production in this discourse as knowledge, is an excess — a burden for the artist, which at the same time can become an impetus for him or her to continue creating (being invested or wasted). Moreover, what is in fact the product of a given discourse will never be attainable for its agent. Artists will never know what others really think of their works, and they will never become an "artist-who-knows".

The truth of this discourse in the logic of art turns out to be the enjoyment of the act of creation. For the question of the truth of the work of art, and the answer to that question, will always miss the point, since the process of artistic creation includes an unconscious desire which determined the final shape of the work — an error which sometimes turns out to be a fortunate error. It is that kind of an error that the artist is able to accept, despite the lack of knowledge of its true cause. This is what precisely makes the artist-who-does-not-know divided.

Hysterical discourse can also be conceptualised as the subject's resistance to the interpellation (in its Althusserian sense: a call, a social obligation), to follow here Mladen Dolar's attempt to see the psychoanalytical theory of the subject as exactly "beyond interpellation" (Dolar, 1993). This resistance expresses a lack of belief in the symbolic position ascribed to the subject. In the case of the artist's discourse, this is also applicable, since this discourse expresses precisely the social functioning of the artist as the one who has to face the codification of his work by other subjects operating in the field of art — state institutions, private galleries, art critics, collectors, the public — all of which, from the artist's point of view, are merely different versions of the recipient. In this context, a more general form of the question of the

legitimacy of a work's interpretation is to ask, "Why are you telling me that as an artist I am what you claim that I am?", or even, "Why are you telling me that I am an artist at all?"

DISCOURSE OF THE ANALYST = DISCOURSE OF THE ACT
OF CREATION (MODEL I)

Analyst's discourse:

$$\frac{a}{S2} \rightarrow \frac{\$}{S1}$$

The discourse of the act of creation:

$$\frac{\text{jouissance of the act of creation}}{\text{artist-who-knows}} \rightarrow \frac{\text{artist-who-does-not-know}}{\text{recipient}}$$

Transcribing the analyst's discourse into the logic of art seems to be a still more difficult task, since it belongs to an analytical situation characterised by a great deal of specificity. However, let us start with the fact that this discourse should include both the analyst and the analysand. After the process of hysterisation, the subject of analysis must then move to the analyst's discourse, which can be explained by the simple formula that in analysis it is the analysand who is ultimately supposed to analyse themselves. Hence he or she is precisely the analysand — not the patient. The latter is rather the object of the university discourse in its subtype of medical discourse (Žižek, 1998: 78). Moreover, it is a position on which one cannot dig in: during analysis, even if one reaches the discourse of the analyst, one must return back to the hysterical position, the only one whose product is knowledge. There is also the possibility of the end of analysis. In the same way, in the logic of art, in which the place of the agent in the counterpart of the analyst's discourse, after another quarter-turn, is taken by the *jouissance* of the creative act, one cannot occupy this position infinitely. The person performing the act does not stop there — one must turn to the Other, whose place is taken here by the artist-who-does-not-know. Just as it is not the analyst who is in the process, but the analysand, so the artist is in the process in which he or she must construct a dialectical distance between the work and himself or herself. Being aware of what one is doing, starting from losing oneself in the process, and directing towards interpreting one's own work, but with remnant of things that stuck — that is, again, the second

name of analysis. Of course, the most important is this something that will always remain, which can never be subject to interpretation. In the language of Lacanian psychoanalysis, this is the *sinthome*, the product of analysis. It can be viewed as what occupies in the analyst's discourse the very place of the excessive product-loss. As Žižek puts it: "[w]hat this discourse 'produces' is then the Master-Signifier (i.e., the unconscious 'sinthome'), the cipher of enjoyment, to which the subject was unknowingly subjected" (Žižek, 1998: 80). *Sinthome* is a kernel, an irreducible symptom inseparable from *jouissance*, which resists interpretation. There is nothing left for interpretation or analysis — hence the end comes. In the discourses of art, the letter of the recipient falls here. How are we to understand this?

What seems to come out here is a fact we already touched upon in the first discourse: that art requires a recipient. Should we draw the conclusion that, despite the egoism attributed to artistic production, it is created for the Other? Unfortunately, from the point of view of the process and starting from the enjoyment of the act of creation, the recipient cannot be grasped. And *sinthome* itself is devoid of any relation to the Other. So we cannot be satisfied with this formula. Rather, *sinthome* is a way of capturing *jouissance* that the subject is unable to relinquish, *jouissance* that already functions outside the order defined by the Other (which does not exist) (Lacan, 2006: 700; Miller, 2016: 116).⁴ Moreover, Lacan formulated his concept of the *sinthome* precisely on the basis of artistic creation (Lacan, 2016).

But let's think naively for a moment — it is obvious that the product of the act of creation is the work of art. But what does it mean that the work is the recipient and that it is lost? The work is a part of me, and at the same time, I have to let it go. I cannot cling to it, just as following the Thanatic drive to the end would mean death. Yet it exists, and I must somehow come to terms with it. One way to do this is through analysis that is brought to a structural end. Although I am personally opposed to seeing art as self-therapy, I do not foreclose here a certain identity of the analyst's room, the couch, and the artist's studio. Just as Lacan conceptualised the necessity of the end of the analysis, the recipient, in the place of the product, as a loss, represents here the necessity to sooner or later leave the studio. Although art does not exist except as a social construction (or: precisely as such it is that which does not exist), there remains a moment beyond this big Other of the modern field of art, which makes possible this (in)existence of art. Here we can see how the artist's own language starts with non-linguistic element (*jouissance* of the act of creation), but its true result is an elaboration of an even more fundamental *jouissance*,

⁴ As J.-A. Miller writes: "in order to liberate access to *jouissance* as impossible to negate [by the Other], so that the subject is no longer obliged to secretly steal *jouissance* [from the Other], no longer separated from it, but instead might form a new alliance with *jouissance*" (Miller, 2016: 116).

which *S1* in the logic of art embodies in the discourse of the act of creation. Obviously not every work of art arrives at this point.

The truth of the artist's discourse is that the enjoyment of the act of creation is conditioned by the artist-who-knows. At least in two possible senses. Firstly, despite the fact that the artist's Other, to whom he turns, is here the artist-who-doesn't-know, his or her unconscious knows what it desires. Secondly, the internalised experience, whether in the form of accumulated knowledge of the medium in which one creates, or the matter of expression as experiences on which work is based, allows one to deprive oneself of control in the enjoyment of artistic production.

UNIVERSITY DISCOURSE = ARTISAN/FORMALIST'S DISCOURSE
(MODEL II)

University discourse:

$$\frac{S2}{S1} \rightarrow \frac{a}{\$}$$

The discourse of the artisan/formalist:

$$\frac{\text{artist-who-knows}}{\text{recipient}} \rightarrow \frac{\text{jouissance of the act of creation}}{\text{artist-who-does-not-know}}$$

The agent of university discourse simulates non-involvement as an objective observer of an objectified problem. It can be said that the artist we are dealing with here, on the contrary, is fully engaged in what he or she is doing, in the subjective act of creation and the enjoyment that flows from it, in which one loses oneself. For it is to *jouissance* of the creative act that the agent of the artisan/formalist's discourse, the artist-who-knows, is directed. However, this situating oneself in the position of knowledge, as a starting position, does not usually mean anything good in Lacan's thought, and Lacan himself did not want to be a part of the university discourse (Lacan, 2007: 109). Paradoxically, the two are not mutually exclusive: non-involvement, the appearance of objectivity, and involvement (losing oneself in the object) go here hand in hand. Either as a formalist, repeating a certain type of representation, or as a craftsman, following an established method, a technology that does not allow deviations — such an artist is lost in a practice subordinated to knowledge. He or she already knows who they are supposed to be as an artist.

This stands in contradiction to the dynamic concept of creation. So, just as the university discourse is a dead end in psychoanalysis, a regression from the master's discourse, this model of creation that only simulates the proper distance necessary for the creative act, slips into a repetition without difference. This is a situation characteristic of many currents of 20th-century modernism, which abandoned, for example, the avant-garde intention to create the world through art and settled instead into pure formalism, resulting in the repetition of certain forms. This was accompanied by the subsumption of art by capitalist mechanisms (another dimension of modernity). The late phase of American Abstract Expressionism and its theoretical framework invented by the greatest consecrator of 20th-century formalism, Clement Greenberg, serves as a most symptomatic example. The enjoyment here is that which comes from following a known pattern and thus loses its subversive potential and therefore should not be treated as a goal in itself.

Inevitably, the product here is an artist-who-does-not-know, and he doesn't know in the simplest sense of these words. Since one does not know how to negate oneself, he or she repeats what is known to him/her. At the same time, in a more indirect sense, this also means that an artist like this cannot become an artist-who-does-not-know like his or her hysterical counterpart who is the primary subject of creation, playing the role of an agent in the discourse of the artist, and as the one's Other in the discourse of the creative act.

The truth of this discourse is the recipient. In the case of the artisan, this explains the expectation of a certain functional product, made on the basis of technological standards. In the case of formalism, there is an expectation of a certain "style" that is supposed to guarantee the artist's recognition.

COMPARISON OF THE TWO MODELS OF THE ACT OF CREATION

I also described the last two discourses — the discourse of the act of creation and the discourse of the artisan/formalist — as models: model I and model II. Just as the first two discourses mainly deal with a situation when the work has been completed, the relation between what was exhibited and the recipient, or the artist and the recipient, and the attitude towards what was created, the last two discourses focus on the act of creation itself. Distance plays a key role in the artistic process — we deal with it in both models. At first glance, the discourse of the creative act, starting from the enjoyment of the act, is devoid of distance, while the discourse of the artisan/formalist, starting from the knowledge and directed towards the enjoyment of the act, is precisely characterised by distance. But in fact the situation is quite the opposite. Because the distance of the fourth discourse is a false distance — the clotted blood of knowledge, like the certainty of the method, does not allow for a distance

from the method nor thus for its development. It does not allow any mistakes. It does not allow for the necessary struggle against one's own clichés — something articulated as a condition for the beginning of the artistic process, considering Francis Bacon's in Gilles Deleuze's conception (Deleuze, 2003: 35, 87–96). For Deleuze, the main opposition to Bacon was Jackson Pollock — an artist who well exemplifies the case of the formalist lost in the gesture of modernist repetition. The discourse of the act of creation, on the other hand, is oriented to the element of unawareness (non-knowledge), the element of creative failure which sometimes results in a fortunate accident, but most often becomes a driving force for further artistic development.

CONCLUSION

In attempting to rewrite Lacanian discourses into the logic of art, I firstly attempted to show the cracks and frictions that we face when trying to take a certain position in regard to what we used to call creativity. Taking a certain stance, that of a recipient or that of an artist, while at an exhibition or in one's own studio, precipitates something that irritates, forcing one to move between discourses. Being a recipient, one can never reach the enjoyment of the creative act which — as a tormenting, unattainable remnant — can contribute to one's entering the discourse of the artist which will be occupied by another, different, loss. One cannot have it all. Every artist started as a recipient, yet no artist really knows what it means to be one. This feeling is given for a moment by artistic practice, but every artist will sooner or later leave the studio. Unless he or she settles on the pseudo-laurels of the last discourse.

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