



e-ISSN 2084-1043 p-ISSN 2083-6635  
Published online: 31.03.2025

**ARGUMENT**  
BIANNUAL PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNAL  
Vol. 14 (2/2024) pp. 283-294  
www.argument-journal.eu

## Individuality and America

### The influence of Friederich Meinecke in Antonello Gerbi's Latin American studies

Roberto COLONNA\*

#### ABSTRACT

This essay aims to present a new reading of some passages of Antonello Gerbi's seminal work *The dispute of the New World. History of a polemic, 1750-1900*, to highlight the critical historicist influences underpinning Gerbi's text. The study takes the form of a comparison of the writings of Antonello Gerbi and Friedrich Meinecke, one of the leading exponents of the philosophical current in question, selecting passages from Meinecke's last book where their "cultural proximity" is more explicit and striking.

#### KEYWORDS

historicism; individuality; interpretation; Antonello Gerbi; Friedrich Meinecke; Latin American

---

\* Ph.D., scientific editor (CIRFF), University of Naples, Federico II. E-mail: roberto.colonna@unina.it.

*What Tarquinius Superbus meant by cutting poppies in his garden was understood by his son, but not by the messenger.*<sup>1</sup>

Johann Georg Hamann

## INTRODUCTION

Antonello Gerbi devoted a substantial portion of his scholarly work to analysing the intricate relationships between Europe and America, with particular emphasis on the historical and cultural dynamics that defined their interactions. His intellectual trajectory was profoundly shaped by his experience of exile in Peru (Patuelli, 2020: 77), a pivotal period that significantly influenced the evolution of his thought. As Maria Matilde Benzoni observes, the experience of exile prompted Gerbi to a “discovery of the New World”, which materialised as a rediscovery of his own European identity and the historical traditions to which he was heir (Benzoni, 2021: 283–284).

Gerbi’s distance from Europe (which was not merely geographical) provided him with a privileged perspective, allowing him, through the lens of American alterity, to challenge several prevailing historiographical and philosophical models in Western academic circles of the 20th century. Through a critical rereading of European sources, Gerbi proposed an image of the so-called “New World” as an autonomous and complex reality, deconstructing traditional narratives and offering a more nuanced and pluralistic vision of cultural differences (Benzoni, 2021: 291).

Among these sources, one often overlooked in the critical studies of Gerbi’s thought is his engagement with Friedrich Meinecke, a prominent figure in critical historicism. Meinecke’s approach does not represent an explicit theoretical model for Gerbi but rather a conceptual source shaping his analytical method. In his writings, Gerbi never directly references Meinecke or openly acknowledges his influence. However, a comparative analysis of Meinecke’s texts and Gerbi’s works reveals a clear convergence on key themes, such as the significance of historical individuality and the critique of cultural generalisations.

This convergence can be understood in the light of Gerbi’s attendance at several seminars conducted by Friedrich Meinecke in Berlin during the 1930s. These academic exchanges reinforced a theoretical orientation initially introduced to Gerbi by Benedetto Croce (Pompejano, 2013: 11). Croce, Gerbi’s mentor, emphasised the importance of appreciating the “specificity” of historical

---

<sup>1</sup> Hamann, 1822: 190. Author’s translation. From here on, in the absence of reference to a translator, the translations in this article are the work of the author.

events and attending to the unique details of the cultural and social contexts in which each phenomenon takes place.

In *The dispute of the New World*, Gerbi critically examines the cultural and ideological construction of America from a European perspective — a construction that, as Benzoni suggests, often mirrors European projections and prejudices more than it reflects American reality itself (Benzoni, 2021: 291). Gerbi's work thus constitutes a deconstructive endeavour: through a meticulous analysis of European perceptions of the New World, he reveals how America was not seen as an autonomous cultural entity but rather as a distorted reflection of Europe.

This research brings Gerbi into a critical confrontation with figures like Hegel, whose philosophy epitomises Europe's failure to recognise America as an autonomous cultural "Other", instead relegating it to a subordinate appendage of Western civilisation. The thesis of this article is that Gerbi neither engages with Meinecke directly nor adopts his thought as a foundational theoretical basis. Instead, Gerbi integrates the Meineckean concept of historical individuality to support a critical vision in which America becomes an independent context rather than a warped projection of Europe. According to Gerbi, the differences between Europe and America do not signify cultural, moral, or even "natural" inferiority. Instead, they represent distinct historical developments which invite a re-evaluation of human history as a whole, free from hierarchies and prejudices.

## INDIVIDUALITY AND AMERICA

Gerbi was a remarkable intellectual, not so much because of his erudition, which, despite his degree in law, was essentially the result of his own studies, as for a propensity for penetrating reflection that frequently led him to call his own standpoint into question. A concrete demonstration of this tendency can be seen in the way he constantly revised and corrected his writing throughout his life.<sup>2</sup> Even today, forty years after his death,<sup>3</sup> his reputation is still linked to his studies on Latin America.<sup>4</sup> A field that, paradoxically, was forced upon Gerbi, a sophisticated scholar of 18th-century European culture, by history's

---

<sup>2</sup> A striking example of Gerbi's penchant for revising, changing or simply adding to his writing, often after publication, is his volume *A portrait of Peru*. At the same time, however, one must not forget the "negative bibliography" that concluded the first draft of *The dispute on the New World. History of a polemic, 1750–1900*: this long list contains seventeen pages of texts that Gerbi was not able to consult at that time but which he considered fundamental to the arguments he had addressed, arguments that he felt should be used to supplement later editions of the work.

<sup>3</sup> Gerbi died in his home in Civenna, in the province of Como, on July 26th, 1976.

<sup>4</sup> On the importance of Antonello Gerbi to American studies, see Carmagnani, 1978; Pranzetti, 1992.

turn of events and his own personal circumstances. The libraries in Lima, where he fled in 1938 to escape the racial laws and the War, with the providential intervention of Raffaele Mattioli, had little to offer.<sup>5</sup> South America thus provided the stimulus for Gerbi to go on reading and writing during the ten years of what was effectively his exile, but above all a different and more virginal perspective from which to observe the European cultural horizon. His Latin American studies are not only atypical but remain unsurpassed in their rigor and depth. Moreover, the erudition and breadth of perspective that characterise his work laid the foundation for one of the masterpieces of 20th-century essay writing, *The dispute of the New World. The history of a polemic, 1750–1900*.

The *Dispute* had a very long gestation: Gerbi nursed the idea of addressing the subject at an early age, as seen in a note in his first book, *La politica del Settecento*, where he makes some observations on the “myth of the good savage” (Gerbi, 1928: 85, n. 3).<sup>6</sup> Naturally, his transfer to Peru provided, as mentioned above, the ultimate stimulus to move into American studies, and the first work in this new field appeared in the 1943 *Vieja polemicas sobre el nuevo mundo* (Gerbi, 1943). This work was the starting point for more wide-ranging research that gradually led Gerbi towards the first edition of the *Dispute* (Gerbi, 1955), which, between being translated into Spanish and then into English,<sup>7</sup> was expanded and improved until the 1983 and 2000 editions, published posthumously by his son, Sandro.

<sup>5</sup> For a personal and intellectual history of Antonello Gerbi, see Treves, 1955; Gerbi S., 1991; Gerbi S., 1993; Focher, 1987.

<sup>6</sup> This information is also mentioned by Sandro Gerbi in his introduction to the 2000 edition of the *Dispute* (cf. Gerbi S., 2000: V). In this footnote, despite being unable as yet to foresee the future developments of his studies at this time, Antonello Gerbi seems to lay the foundations for the much later drafting of the *Dispute*: “Against the *engouement* of savage-loving, and explicitly polemical against missionaries and religion, and implicitly against Rousseau [...] M. de P. (Abbé Corneille De Pauw) [...] wrote his *Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains*. Here, the conquest of America is described as ‘the greatest misfortune of humanity,’ and every degeneracy of the savages is crudely described. But since the Europeans gave the Americans the smallpox, and in return these gave them syphilis, the match is even. Count Gian Rinaldo Carli of Capodistria replied with his *American Letters* (often also cited by De Maistre for his defence of missionaries) and the Benedictine Abbot of Brigel, Dom Pernetty, with a *Dissertation sur l’Amérique et les Américains* to which he promptly answered with a *Défense des ‘Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains’ de M. de P.* obviously by De Pauw himself. Over the years to come, he extended the controversy to other peoples then highly fashionable with his *Recherches philosophiques sur les Egyptiens et les Chinois* (concluding with the denial of any relationship between the two peoples and the denigration of the Chinese), and finally, with the re-establishment of Classicism, he published two volumes of *Recherches philosophiques sur les Grecs*. On the first controversy, which re-emerged with the birth of the United States, in which Buffon and Jefferson also participated, see also Galliani and Fay Bernard” (Gerbi, 1928: 85–86). The translation of this passage is by the author.

<sup>7</sup> There are altogether three translations of the *Dispute*, one in Spanish (*La disputa del nuevo mundo. Historia de una polémica*, 1960, reprint 1982, by Antonio Alatorre for El Fondo

The greatness of this work, however, paradoxically cast a shadow over all the other elements shaping Gerbi's eclectic academic personality — ranging from 18th-century studies to Romanticism and the cinema.<sup>8</sup> It should be added that despite succeeding in its gargantuan purpose of being a history of Latin American historiography, the *Dispute* is often constrained within the narrow limits of the discipline in which, at least on the formal level, it moves. Yet the *Dispute* is at least two other things: a refined interpretation of the ways in which European culture expressed itself on anything that was not European and, at the same time, an implicit cultural manifesto of Gerbi the scholar. Both aspects can be included within the current of thought that — having developed in the closing decades of the 19th century and, according to some scholars, ended between the two World Wars — is known as critical historicism.

This connection is based on at least two considerations, one biographical and the other conceptual. The first is quite simple to address. The friendship and constant cultural exchange between Gerbi and Benedetto Croce are so well known that there is no need to rehearse them here. It should, however, be pointed out that when Gerbi won a Rockefeller Foundation scholarship for the two-year period from 1929 to 1931, he spent much of his time in Berlin where he attended seminars by Friedrich Meinecke, one of the founding fathers of critical historicism, of whom Gerbi's son Sandro has an “undying memory” (Gerbi S., 2000: XX).

So, any attempt to superimpose the themes put forward by Meinecke and those found in the *Dispute* makes it possible to understand the connection between Gerbi and the aforementioned critical historicism. The decision to choose only the *Dispute* as the second term of comparison in this analysis is intentional, grounded in the belief that a work that helped to “hem Gerbi in” within a limited number of subject areas may, in fact, be the key to his liberation.

#### THE INFLUENCE OF FRIEDERICH MEINECKE IN ANTONELLO GERBI'S LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES

To fulfil this difficult task, perhaps it is first necessary to recall some of the highlights of Meinecke's historical thought and his learned introduction to *The origins of historicism* of 1936. The decision to focus on this introduction

---

de Cultura Económico), one in English (*The dispute of the New World. The history of a polemic*, 1973, by Jeremy Moyle for the University of Pittsburgh Press) and one in Portuguese from 1996 (Benzoni, 2009).

<sup>8</sup> All Gerbi's articles on cinema are collected in: Gerbi, 2011. Worthy of note in this regard is Guido Aristarco's fine treatment of Gerbi the cinema theorist in his well-known essay *Storia delle teorie del film* (Aristarco, 1963: 132–134, 268–279).

may be justified by the ‘structural resemblance’ of *The origins of historicism* to Gerbi’s *Dispute*. Meinecke’s work is a history of 18th-century (mainly German) philosophy, and it aims to reconstruct the process that led to a shift from a generalising view of the human world to an individualising vision, from mechanism to the concept of development, in order to identify a different kind of historicism from Hegel’s, one represented in particular by Goethe. From the few pages preceding this text it is possible to gain an understanding of what this “critical historicism” is and how Meinecke understood it. This is also the best place to begin discerning the characteristics of Gerbi’s *Weltanschauung*.

The task of historicism was to weaken and transform rigid naturalist thought and its belief in the invariability of supreme human ideals into something more fluid [...]. A first step in this direction came about with a general shift in philosophical thinking already found in the seventeenth century, especially in the philosophy of Descartes. Until then, ingenuously persuaded of the power of human reason, thinkers had tried to apply it in order to grasp the objectivity of the world, but now, the knowing subject and his legitimation on the basis of the laws to be found within him were being put into question. In this shift towards the problem of subjectivity the first signs of an imminent revolution in thinking emerge (Meinecke, 1959: 3).

The revolution in thought to which Meinecke refers is precisely, as he goes on to say a few lines later, the advent of critical historicism (Meinecke, 1959: 3). Moreover, for Meinecke, the knowing subject envisaged by Descartes and the French enlightenment that followed him, cannot be considered an individual subject as an end in himself with his *raison d’être* in the multiple forms of his historical living. Descartes’ subject is still a universal subject, the result of an essentially abstract idea of man who affirms his true essence in the continual and sterile pursuit of general theoretical laws that ought to allow mankind to master the codes of knowledge. Such beliefs, developing from the very start within “a thinking elevated to a level of mathematical clarity and evidence, first and foremost in the strict application of the law of causality” (Meinecke, 1959: 3), lay the foundations for the modern conception of natural law. The very discoveries that challenged the natural sciences from the 17th century onwards did not undermine, but actually confirmed the naturalist perspective so that it began to have an impact on the most diverse fields of knowledge. History thus became the dominion of mechanical causality and reason itself, the organ dedicated to subjective interpretation, was transformed, in the minds of those aspiring to mathematical certainty, into something that worked through absolutes. This was a position that developed and was strictly applied starting from the axiom of the immutability of human reason.

Naturalistic reasoning, prevalent since antiquity, inculcated faith in the immutability of human nature, especially in human reason. [According to naturalists] the assertions

of reason can [also] be obscured by the passions and ignorance, but if reason is able to free itself of these obscurities, it asserts the same things at all times, [and] is capable of finding eternal truths of absolute value which wholly correspond to the rationality of the entire universe (Meinecke, 1959: 9–10).

On these premises, belief in natural law found many points of convergence with Christianity, with which it formed a privileged and lasting bond. A bond that has left a profound mark on Western culture, in its religious and “profane” spheres alike. Meinecke himself recognises that this form of natural law has been

a polestar amid the storms of history, [and] has been a fixed point in life for thinking men; all the more so if sustained by faith in revolution. It was possible to apply it to the most diverse and conflicting ideologies. Human reason, conceived as eternal and outside time, could justify all these ideologies, but it was not understood that reason itself had lost its timeless character and showed itself for what it really was, a historically changing force always susceptible to new individualisations. [...] Religion and natural law largely overlapped and jointly had a strong influence on men (Meinecke, 1959: 11).

After defining everything that historicism is not and identifying those who, like Descartes, were among the first to show a sensibility in some respects not far removed from this current of thought, Meinecke defines the characteristics proper to historicism. First, he introduces its time coordinates: “The genesis of historicism”, he says, “takes us back more than ever to the second half of the nineteenth century” (Meinecke, 1959: 11). Then, bearing in mind Nietzsche’s lesson (especially the Nietzsche of the *Second untimely meditation*), he explains what historicism is:

The first principle of historicism consists in replacing a generalising and abstract consideration of historical-human forces with a consideration of their individual character (Meinecke, 1959: 10).

Individuality, both at the personal level and in real and ideal collective entities, is revealed only through evolution. There are several concepts of evolution [...]. We distinguish [however] between the concept of the evolution of highly spontaneous historicism, with concrete possibilities of transformation, and the narrower concept of the growth of seeds that are already sown, and what we call the Enlightenment criterion of improvement that successively became faith in progress, both in terms of purely empirical progress and idealised progress (Meinecke, 1959: 12).

These positions, and most probably these very pages, were well known to Antonello Gerbi. There is a passage in the *Dispute* that seems to offer his reader a brief summary of these themes, a synthesis that also allows him to

highlight the (none too veiled) cultural trajectories that underpin his analysis. In this passage he says:

In the early nineteenth century, when historicism pervaded the natural sciences and transformed them from being sciences of the immobile, with uniform laws, into the sciences of the eternally changing and the creative, even this enormous subject of the science of nature, the American continent, had to be seen from another perspective. Its age could no longer be expressed in qualitative terms: if young, immature; if old, decadent. Nor could it be compared to the Ancient World as if they were two static, measurable, mutually comparable quantities. In the flow of becoming, all phenomena regained their autonomy. [...] In short, the fictitious antithesis that opposed the New and the Ancient Worlds, the geography of America and that of Europe, had to break down as soon as geography, like all the other natural sciences, was reabsorbed into history, as soon as spatial determinations, mutually extrinsic by definition and so tending to behave as polar dyads, faded into an organic concept of the only and infinite reality, in a vivid Humboldtian depiction of the Cosmos (Gerbi A., 2000: 613).

It is clear how each of the two discourses, those of Meinecke and Gerbi, look like the result of the other. Furthermore, Gerbi uses evidently historicist terminology, such as the Nietzschean creative, when discussing the sciences or the Diltheyan becoming when he explains the characteristics of historical phenomena. Lastly, he quotes Humboldt, considered by many, but above all by Fulvio Tessitore,<sup>9</sup> to be the one who opened the way to critical historicism, “practising it”, as Claudio Cesa put it, “without claiming to make it a ‘system’”. Indeed, “he reacts to logical and metaphysical construction, so common among his generation, and refuses to admit that the history of the spirit could be understood as a necessary succession of concepts” (Cesa, 2006: 218).

Gerbi’s proximity in the *Disputa* to the themes of critical historicism can also be seen in another important element — his harsh criticism of Hegel, the author who perhaps more than any other represented cultural and moral opposition to critical historicism. Quoting Dilthey’s *The history of Hegel’s youth*,<sup>10</sup> Gerbi states that Hegel’s philosophy of history

rests on the concept of “being other than self”, a specifically scholastic invention or formula of knowing, and develops on almost naively anthropocentric lines. The Earth is the supreme theatre of the Spirit. In this pre-Copernican or substantially Biblical

<sup>9</sup> Among the numerous works Fulvio Tessitore dedicated to Humboldt’s relationship with critical historicism see, especially for its exhaustive bibliography, the essays *Attualità di W. v. Humboldt* (pp. 527–536), *Humboldt e la Universalgeschichte* (pp. 537–578), *L’etica di Humboldt* (pp. 579–694), *Note su Humboldt politico* (pp. 595–618), *L’università di Humboldt* (pp. 619–629), *Hegel e Humboldt: l’antico tra ontologia e antropologia* (pp. 629–660), *Humboldt, Niebuhr e la “Decadenzidee”* (pp. 661–708), published in Tessitore, 2002.

<sup>10</sup> Dilthey, 1921. Gerbi read this work of Dilthey in Spanish — at least that is the language of the text he cites in *Disputa* (Gerbi A, 2000: 611, n. 1).



view of the Universe, it is more than conceivable that the Ancient World should have extraordinary importance, and that America, Oceania and all the rest of the globe should disappear and almost lose their *raison d'être* (Gerbi A., 2000: 614–615).

Hegel's repudiation of America shows, for Gerbi, "how much endured in his thinking that was antiquated and fragile and scientifically dead" (Gerbi A., 2000: 613). Indeed,

serious residuals of medievalism can easily be discovered among the materials from which his [massive] system is built. In the realms of Nature, every species exists only insofar as it embodies a moment of the Logos. But the natural American species are deficient: rejects or rough regurgitations of the Logos. It is not difficult to recognise in these explanations, from the ingenuous to the pedantic, the *caput mortuum* of the old metaphysics (Gerbi A., 2000: 615).

Lastly, concludes Gerbi,

the forms of the existent that Hegel hastens to deduce and roll out one after the other in a necessary chain are the evident reincarnation of those kinds of ideas which, from Plato onwards, Western thought had begun to arrange in a necessarily complete uninterrupted chain, from the Supreme God down to the lowliest of creatures. Hegel's Logos moves along its path backwards but, no matter how great and significant this reversal of motion, it fails to alter the typical centuries-old model (Gerbi A., 2000: 615).

This temporalised form of movement between the various types of living things, which came into being during the 18th century to harmonise the static and rigid character of the eternal chain with the new faith in progress, served as a bridge between the Platonic and Neoplatonic system and the new historicist-dialectics. On this point too, Gerbi's judgment of Hegel is biting:

Hegel tries to give life and movement precisely to the inert natural chain, trying to saturate it with active spirituality. But the dead weight of that adopted model overwhelms, suffocates and paralyzes the new principles. The continents refuse to organise themselves into categories or antinomies. Animals do not resign themselves to being mere variants of the Animal, modified and worn-out specimens of an imaginary totem postulated by a professor of philosophy. The striking failure of the attempt, with its strident discords of "impotent" nature, limping triads, things and beings devoid of Spirit, illuminates the inadequacy of a mythological-mystic structure such as that of the infinite scale of prototypes, to receive the concepts of historical thinking that sees the one in the individual, [and] not in the species or [in the] idea; and infinite in the concrete one itself, and not in its multiplication *ad infinitum*, along a graded, perpetual, and endless arc (Gerbi A., 2000: 614).

Gerbi thus uses the American "case" to settle the score with Hegel for good. America therefore stands as an exemplary model able to show all the

weaknesses of Hegel's thinking and all the perspectives that derive from it. In this respect, one of Gerbi's great merits was that he highlighted, through a problem-based approach, the limits of each position, and he projected, without force, the results of his research beyond his own scope of investigation (Melis, 2000: 942–943).

### (SOME) CONCLUSIONS

All in all, the underlying insight in the *Dispute* can be summarised in the simple and therefore difficult thesis, that differences do not mean distance, that they do not imply a relationship between a superior and an inferior, between those who attack and those who defend themselves. Differences are nothing but the other face of the mirror, which at first sight may seem unrecognisable, distant, even “impoverished” and incomprehensible but, on closer inspection, reflects those who look into it — indeed “is” the ones who are reflected as long as they are able and willing to recognise themselves in it. The America of Buffon and De Pauw, to remain with some of the best-known themes of the work, is that of the European: short-sighted, selfish, arrogant and deaf, fearful of the new. He closes himself off when faced with his “purest” (i.e. “animal”) impulses. This is a Europe of misguided charity or rather, charity interpreted for its own benefit — to legitimise or justify its choices, rigidity and mistakes. With meticulous attention to detail, Gerbi questions a whole set of mythologies, false scientific notions and supposed “laws” of history that had been used for centuries to describe America, a continent robbed of its material wealth, culture and hope. His intent is not only to reconstruct a series of theories from conception to inevitable decline, but also, to address those whose world is made up of “absolutes” and “certainties” and who hide behind hypocrisy and fine words, in an attempt, as a historicist, to bring out the centrality of individuality in that “finite section of the infinite devoid of a sense of the happening of the world” (Weber, 1985: 202), an individuality, both of itself and as a historical dimension (that by constitution is) subject to the dominion of interpretation. The dominion of interpretation is one which, while being linked (but not limited) to the sphere of subjectivity, makes it possible to reveal all the “moral mystification” arising from a fear of the opinion of others, “like a window in which we ourselves continue to arrange, to hide or show, the presumed qualities that others attribute to us, and to deceive ourselves” (Nietzsche, 2016: aphorism number 385). Gerbi considers that the problem of relations with others, whether an individual or a whole culture can be traced back to Kant's concept of responsibility or responsible action which, in turn, leads him once again to Meinecke. Not only as an Americanist, but also as a historian and historian of historiography, Gerbi operates as a clear-sighted and skilled philosopher of

history, starting out, as we have seen, from clearly recognisable cultural coordinates in pursuit of precise goals.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aristarco, G. (1963). *Storia delle teoriche del film*. Turin: Einaudi.
- Benzoni, M.M. (2008). The idea of Europe and the *Dispute of the New World*. Some reflections between history and historiography. *History of European Ideas*, 34(4), 375–382.
- Benzoni, M.M. (2009). Genesi e fortuna de *La disputa del nuovo mondo*. Versioni, edizioni e traduzioni di un “libro a organetto” (1943–2000) (pp. 119–138). In: E. Perassi & F. Pino (Eds.). *Antonello Gerbi tra vecchio e nuovo mondo*. Milan: Cisalpino.
- Benzoni, M.M. (2021). Antonello Gerbi’s *Discovery of the New World*: Life experience and the practice of history (1938–1948) (pp. 282–305). In: G. Abbattista (Ed.). *Global perspectives in modern Italian culture: Knowledge and representation of the world in Italy from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century*. London: Routledge.
- Carmagnani, M. (1978). Antonello Gerbi e il Nuovo Mondo. *Rivista storica italiana*, 90, 165–171.
- Cesa, C. (2006). A partire da Humboldt. *Archivio di storia della cultura*, 19, 223–231.
- Dilthey, W. (1921). *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels und andere Abhandlungen zur Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus (=Gesammelte Schriften, 4)*. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner.
- Focher, F. (1987). Sulla riedizione de *La disputa del Nuovo Mondo* (pp. 127–147). In: F. Focher. *Logica e politica in B. Croce*. Milan: Franco Angeli editore.
- Gerbi, A. (1928). *La politica del settecento: storia di un’idea*. Bari: Laterza.
- Gerbi, A. (1943). *Viejas polemicas sobre el Nuevo mundo (comentarios a una tesis de Hegel)*. Lima: Banco de credito del Perú.
- Gerbi, A. (1955). *La disputa del Nuovo Mondo. Storia di una polemica, 1750–1900*. Milan–Naples: R. Ricciardi.
- Gerbi, A. (2000). *La disputa del nuovo mondo. Storia di una polemica (1750–1900)*. Milan: Adelphi.
- Gerbi, A. (2011). *Preferisco Charlot. Scritti sul cinema (1926–1933)*. Turin: Aragno.
- Gerbi, S. (1991). Antonello Gerbi “americanista” o “europeista”? *I Viaggi di Erodoto*, September, 98–104.
- Gerbi, S. (1993). Il filosofo domato. *Belfagor*, 48, 327–339.
- Gerbi, S. (2000). *Don Ferrante e il nuovo mondo* (pp. XV–XXVIII). In: A. Gerbi. *La disputa del nuovo mondo. Storia di una polemica (1750–1900)*. Milan: Adelphi.
- Hamann, J.G. (1822). *Hamman’s Schriften. Dritter Theil*. (F. Roth, Ed.) Berlin: Reimer.
- Meinecke, F. (1959). *Die Entstehung des Historismus*. Munich: R. Oldenbourg.
- Melis, A. (2000). *Una disputa che continua* (pp. 937–948). In: A. Gerbi. *La disputa del Nuovo Mondo. Storia di una polemica (1750–1900)*. Milan: Adelphi.
- Nietzsche, F. (2016). *Morgenröte. Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurteile*. Berlin: Holzinger.
- Patuelli, A. (2020). Banchieri e bancari protagonisti della Resistenza. *Nuova Antologia*, 624, 77–80.
- Pompejano, D. (2013). Sulla storiografia italiana dell’America Latina. *Il Politico*, 78(3), 11–42.
- Pranzetti, L. (1992). Il Perù di Antonello Gerbi. *Il Veltro*, 36, 157–170.
- Rambaldi, E.I. (2014). Storiografia crociana e storia delle idee: l’Adamo ed Eva di Antonello Gerbi. *Trans/Form/Ação*, 37, 9–37.
- Tessitore, F. (1995). *Contributi alla storia e alla teoria dello storicismo*. Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura.

- Tessitore, F. (2002). *Nuovi contributi alla storia e alla teoria dello storicismo*. Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura.
- Treves, P. (1955). Profilo di Antonello Gerbi (pp. XIX–LXXII). In: A. Gerbi. *La disputa del Nuovo Mondo: Storia di una polemica, 1750–1900*. Milan–Naples: R. Ricciardi.
- Weber, M. (1985). Die “Objektivität” sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis (Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 19. Band, 1904) (pp. 146–214). In: M. Weber. *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. (J. Winckelmann, Ed.). Tübingen: Mohr.