



Introduction to the issue: *Emotions — will — agency*

The main theme of the volume now in your hands is: *Emotions — will — agency*. All these constituent issues, interconnected in various ways, are viewed from the perspective of cognitive science. They are multidimensional and complex, requiring diverse research approaches. They are deeply rooted in a long-standing philosophical tradition, yet at the same time continue to provoke disputes and controversies, raising more questions than definitive answers. The texts gathered in this issue to some extent reflect this multifaceted spectrum. They result from reflections and discussions undertaken during the conference *New Horizons in Cognitive Science: Emotions — Will — Agency*, which took place last year at the University of the National Education Commission in Kraków.

The issue opens with a paper by Mateusz Tofilski entitled *Troski jako elementy kształtujące pole afordancji — koncepcja podmiotowości realizmu krytycznego z perspektywy ucieleśnienia* [*Concerns as constitutive elements of the affordance field — a critical realist account of subjectivity from an embodied perspective*]. The author attempts to incorporate the categories of affordances and field of affordances into the framework of critical realism, referring here to Margaret Archer's model of subjectivity. The role of concerns and reflexivity in shaping the subject-environment relationship is examined, with the example of addiction illustrating the monopolization of the hierarchy of concerns. The author points to the necessity of modifying Archer's model of subjectivity by adopting the concept of moderate embodiment.

The theme of subjectivity is also taken up by Anna Martin. Her article *Selfhood and autonomy from a dynamical perspective* proposes an original, cyclical model of selfhood, based on the assumptions that we are intentional beings and that each stage of intentional activity generates problems that can only be solved at the next stage. The model illustrates the development of subjectivity through affective changes associated with shifts in the motivational system — from its relatively random activation, through the integration of alternative

perspectives, up to reflective autonomy, which sets the boundaries for the individual's future actions.

The text „*Ja*” *minimalne i kształtowanie się poczucia podmiotowości w świetle zjawisk afektywno-emocjonalnych. Między neurobiologiczną koncepcją „proto-ja” a ujęciem fenomenologicznym* [The minimal self and the formation of subjectivity in the light of affective-emotional phenomena. Between the neurobiological concept of “proto-self” and a phenomenological approach] by Adriana Wambier addresses the question how the experience of emotions, grounded in pre-reflective engagement with the world, shapes different modes of self-experience. In addressing this question, the author compares two conceptions of the self — the proto-self conception of Antonio Damasio and the phenomenological approach of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Adriana Schetz, the author of *Między koniecznością a wyborem. Rudymenarna forma wolnej woli na przykładzie działania spontanicznego w modelu zmienności behawioralnej* [Between necessity and choice. The rudimentary form of free will exemplified by spontaneous action in the model of behavioural variability] addresses the issue of free will from the perspective of the philosophy of biology and evolutionary theory. Relying on Björn Brembs' model, she defends the thesis that free will can be understood as a manifestation of causally undetermined behaviours, already exhibited by organisms at the most rudimentary stages of evolutionary development. According to Schetz, taking into account spontaneous activity — which enables organisms to respond flexibly to changing environmental conditions — permits a better account of the sources of agency and the adaptive significance of behavioural variability than that offered by deterministic models.

Tomasz Szubart, the author of the next paper, combines the perspectives of the philosophy of music, cognitive science and evolutionary theory to inquire into the nature of musical emotions. In his text *What are musical emotions? A proposal for a functional–teleosemantic approach*, he proposes a functional–teleosemantic theory of musical emotions, arguing that emotions accompanying music performance, emotions that emerge as biological and cultural functions, gain lasting emotional significance through systematic, ceremonial repetition in specific cultural contexts. In this process, tonal patterns become lasting emotional signals and, over time, meaningful symbols.

In addition to the thematic articles, the volume also includes two additional texts addressing the issue of the presence of evil and cruelty in art. The first is an article by Paweł Dybel entitled *Okrucieństwo ontologiczne i „konwulsyjne piękno” kobiet-lalek Hansa Bellmera* [Ontological cruelty and the “convulsive beauty” of Hans Bellmer's doll-women]. The author investigates the

phenomenon of cruelty in contemporary art and suggests that works of art may reflect a radical change in the way humans relate to being — a change characterized by the adoption of a manipulative and domineering stance towards the world. In this context, contemporary art — exemplified for Dybel by his psychoanalytic reading of Hans Bellmer's series of "dolls" — is confronted with Martin Heidegger's ontological diagnosis.

The articles section ends with Mariusz Oziębłowski's text entitled *O antropologicznych zastosowaniach hermeneutycznej koncepcji sztuki* [On anthropological applications of the hermeneutic concept of art]. Beginning with reflections on attempts to depict historical manifestations of absolute evil in art, the author reveals the inconsistencies between the hermeneutic and postmodern perspectives. Although they appear to invalidate and downplay classical metaphysical categories, they nonetheless formulate categorical, essentialist moral and anthropological judgments when confronted with the aesthetic experience of evil.

In the section *Polemics and Debates*, Maciej Urbanek, in his text *Szczeliny determinacji. Filozoficzna polemika z Robertem M. Sapolskim* [Fissures in determination. A philosophical polemic with Robert M. Sapolsky], engages in a critical discussion with the main theses of Robert Sapolsky's book *Determined. A science of life without free will* (published in Polish as *Zdeterminowany. Jak nauka tłumaczy brak wolnej woli*). Urbanek's polemic thus follows the leading theme of the present volume.

The issue also includes two post-conference reports: Kamil Marszycki's *Sprawozdanie z ogólnopolskiej konferencji „Przemoc i ekonomia — refleksje etyczne”* [Report of the national conference "Violence and Economy — ethical reflections"] and Łukasz Kołoczek's *Szaleństwa nasze współczesne. Sprawozdanie z XV konferencji z cyklu Psychoanaliza — Psychoterapia — Krytyka kultury* [Our contemporary insanities. Report of the XV conference in the series Psychoanalysis — Psychotherapy — Cultural critique].

The last text in this volume is a review by Andrzej Dąbrowski of Marta Soniewicka's book *Emocje a prawo. Znaczenie i rola uczuć w ujęciu filozoficzno-prawnym* [Emotions and the law. The significance and role of feelings in the philosophy of law].

We warmly invite you to read the volume.

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