



## Introduction:

### *Subjectivity in relationship to values and norms*

This issue's topic pertains to relationships which, more or less intentionally, are presupposed, realised, appear, or occur between the subject and values and norms. These wide and complex problems are considered in terms of investigative assumptions adopted by philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, and other humanities and social science researchers. The topic requires a more precise definition of subjectivity (particularly, the subject of choice, decision, and action) and the status of values and norms.

Broadly, the question of subjectivity seems particularly important in the "turns" discussed in the human and social sciences after 2000, which define subjectivity in such a way that abolishes clear distinctions, oppositions, or aporias between subject and object (of cognition and action), subjectivity and objectivity (of principles, models, and systems), the singular case and the general rule, culture and nature, and the human being and other beings. The problematic of subjectivity and the conditions for subjective existence, cognition, and action have been explored by some anthropocentric approaches that are important in modern times, for example, from René Descartes, through Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl — in his phenomenology as developed by contemporary post-phenomenologists — to pragmatism and the pragmatics. Concepts and research traditions such as pragmatism and post-phenomenology reformulate the topic of subjectivity, recognising the primacy of the subjective and anthropological determinants of the human species and individuals, on the assumption of the objectivity of the immaterial, material, intersubjective, environmental, symbolic, and biological conditions and rules of existence, action, and cognition in which the individual subject is defined and which are realised by them.

The following distinctions should aid in elucidating and ordering the complex relationships between the subject and values and norms, the axiological and the normative:

- 1) The subject of action and the subject of tasks: the subject of practice and the performative subject; what is fulfilment — of one's own being, existence, aim, or task?

- 2) The subject of choice and decision: the epistemic subject and the axiological subject; what is the hierarchy of goals and how are they defined in the context of acquiring and accessing knowledge?
- 3) The subject of lived-experience and experience: the aesthetic subject and the ethical subject; what is the relationship between the subject and transcendence; what are the conditions of going beyond immanence; what are the conditions of communication between the subject and the Other, and between the subject and oneself; what conditions and patterns is the restitution of the subject based on — personal, social, economic, or theological?
- 4) The factual subject and the model subject: the modalities of the subject and the models of the subject; to what extent is the general anthropological model of subjectivity valid in the face of the simultaneous recognition of pluralism and diversity for a certain, prescriptive standard; to what extent can model status be subjective?
- 5) The biological subject and the technical subject: the constitution of the subject and the construction of the subject; to what extent do constitution and construction transcend the distinctive division between essentialism and constructivism or constructionism?

Topics in this issue's articles range from the Ancient Greek questions and answers on the positions of individual beings in the universe, through the different subjective possibilities of religious, moral, and ethical choices, to the methodological reflection on defining individuals' positions in social and cultural frameworks.

In the first text, *A revitalisation of virtue ethics in contemporary education*, Anna Drabarek discusses the question of the possibility of applying Aristotle's virtue ethics to the realm of education and using as a guide. The attitude of a justly proud man consists, among other things, in approving of what is good; at the same time, however, he strives towards self-sufficiency. Self-improvement, which emphasises self-sufficiency, often becomes behaviour that can, unfortunately, generate standoffishness, arrogance, and egotism.

Sebastian Hüscher, the author of the second article *Geistlosigkeit. Reflexionen zur Aktualität von Søren Kierkegaards Konstruktion des Selbst im Spannungsfeld von Immanenz und Transzendenz*, analyses the concept of "spiritlessness" as understood by Søren Kierkegaard as a state of mind which cuts out transcendent possibilities for the benefit of reduced immanent probabilities and thus hinders the individual from becoming the true Self. The paper investigates the topicality of Kierkegaard's dialectics of "spirit" and "spiritlessness" for the constitution of the self in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, based on the works by Kierkegaard and, *inter alia*, Martin Heidegger and Charles Taylor.

The third paper, by Jaromir Brejdek, *Genealogy of collective intentionality: Max Scheler and Michael Tomasello*, describes the connections between shared

and collective intentionality, comparing Michael Tomasello's concept with the Schelerian three-dimensional concept of intentionality. This article discusses Tomasello's evolutionary psychology, particularly pondering the horizon of cooperation; and Scheler's phenomenology of acts, especially characterising the horizon of responsibility and co-responsibility, which gives intentionality its unique character. The author's reinterpretation allows him to indicate some similarities of both concepts.

The fourth text, by Anna Alichniewicz, *Monstrous body: between alienness and oneness*, presents phenomenological inquiry into the experience of the Other's monstrous body — a topic which remains mostly untouched in philosophical discourse. A promising framework for the analysis of the ambivalent reaction to the encounter with a monstrous human body can be provided by Edmund Husserl's phenomenological inquiry into the process of "pairing", developed in his *Cartesian meditations*. It seems that in this experience, the "pairing" process is frustrating and deranged because the process of apperception is disturbed by atypical or unique characteristics of the monstrous body.

The fifth article, by Maria Gołębiewska, *Legal interpretation in Paul Amselek's phenomenology of law — between subjectivism and objectivism*, provides an outline of Paul Amselek's assumptions and theses about legal interpretation. One of the methodological aims of Amselek's philosophical reflection is to harmonise two contexts for framing interpretation — the wide context of hermeneutics, and the narrower context of legal logic and argument (including rhetoric and speech act theory). He endeavours to specify the methodological possibilities of interpreting the attitudes, motivations, and affective factors of subjects-participants in communication situation.

Agnieszka Doda-Wyszyńska and Monika Obrębska outline in the sixth paper, *The political subject and hero in culture in the light of Juri Lotman's theory. The case of Lech Wałęsa*, the dependence between culture and its inherent mechanism of forgetting, and between a hero and a political subject. They employ the theory of Juri Lotman, underlining the role of individuals and single events in culture, and analyse an example of the contemporary Polish politician (Lech Wałęsa). Wałęsa exemplifies Lotman's notion of a mobile hero, one who powered the course of history but whose present day political and social activity is of empty character, lacking a goal and deeper meaning. The actions he performs take place within a closed semantic field without new semiotic quality.

The seventh paper, *Transcendentalism, social embeddedness, and the problem of individuality* by Anna Michalska, is a critique of the notion of ecological and social embeddedness from a pragmatic-transcendental viewpoint. The author argues that the most troublesome feature of the concept is that many of its proponents oversimplify by considering selfhood as a form of aberration

which merely provides vindication for inequality and violence. The paper approaches the problem by critiquing Stephen Turner's repudiation of transcendental collectivism and tracks the interrelationships between social development and the development of the self, showing that the relationship between individual selves and social reality is an extremely complex and multifactor matter which we cannot hope to navigate without a proper transcendental frame.

Przemysław Szczurek, the author of the next paper entitled *Dharmarāja and Dhammarāja (II). Yudhiṣṭhira's moral dilemmas before the great battle* (Mahābhārata 5,70), aims at a closer examination of the *Mahābhārata's* adhyāya 5,70. Szczurek analyses the king Yudhiṣṭhira's attitude towards the duty (dharma) of the king and warfare. The king, deprived of his kingdom, states that even though peaceful conflict resolution would be the best, if war is inevitable, it must be accepted eventually. However, he raises some arguments against the war. The analysis of Yudhiṣṭhira's ambivalent utterance is considered in the context of two kinds of references: those echoing the early Buddhist ethics that totally condemn war and other passages from the *Mahābhārata* glorifying the dharma of warriors.

The next paper, by Nina Budziszewska, focuses on *Synkretyczne pouczenie jogiczne w Ācarakasanhicie* (Śarirasthana 1.137–155) [A syncretic yogic instruction in *Carakasanhitā* (Śarirasthana 1.137–155)]. The author examines *Śarirasthana*, a part of the *Ācarakasambhitā*, which comprises the *Upanishads*, the *Mahābhārata*, some Sāṃkhya's and Vaiśeṣika's notions as well as the elements of meditative practice developed in the Buddhist tradition. Budziszewska presents her interpretation of this short Sanskrit treatise reconstructing step by step the subsequent stages of the path of spiritual and psycho-physical discipline (yoga) captured in this crucial source of Indian traditional medicine (*āyurveda*).

In the last article, *Euklidesowy traktat Podział kanonu i pitagorejska harmonika* [The Euclidean *Division of the canon* and Pythagorean harmonics], Anna Maria Laskowska reflects on the Polish translation of a short Ancient Greek treatise *Podział kanonu* [The division of the canon], commonly dated to the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE, and casts doubt that the treatise author is Euclid himself. The treatise essentially consists of two distinct parts: an introduction and twenty theorems in the style of Euclid's *Elements*. An underlying idea of both the introduction and the work on the translation is that *The division of the canon* is an eminently Pythagorean text, which both expressed and proved their conviction about the mathematical structure of the universe. The first Polish translation of this treatise by Laskowska is published in the following column "Translation into Polish".

The final column of the issue contains a book note by Paweł Sznajder who reviews two recently published monographs discussing hermeneutics: Dominika

Członkowie *Zagubienie w interpretacji. Hans-Georg Gadamer wobec kultury i sztuki współczesnej* [Getting lost in the interpretation. Hans-Georg Gadamer in the face of contemporary culture and art] and Jan Pomorski's *Rzecz o wyobraźni historycznej. Ćwiczenia z hermeneutyki* [A thing about historical imagination. Exercises in hermeneutics].

The issue is completed with Magdalena Reuter's summary and commentaries relating to the topics of the book *Being you. A new science of consciousness* by Anil Seth.

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