„Ja” minimalne i kształtowanie się poczucia podmiotowości w świetle zjawisk afektywno­‐emocjonalnych

Między neurobiologiczną koncepcją „proto­‐ja” a ujęciem fenomenologicznym

Abstract

The article addresses the issue of misunderstanding in the description of the nature of emotional phenomena, misunderstanding which stems from treating intellectual cognition and pre­‐reflective affective appraisal as components of emotion in the sense of separate parts, whereas they are in fact two inseparably connected aspects of emotion. Since emotional experience constitutes an integral whole to such an internally profound degree that, as phenomenologically oriented researchers suggest, one cannot separate lived emotion from its expression and from the subject experiencing it, we are faced with the question how emotional experience — occurring at the level of pre­‐reflective experience of the world — influences the formation of various levels of self­‐awareness. Some of these levels of self­‐awareness may be more fundamental than others and they may also affect one another. I attempt to answer this question by comparing two different conceptions of the minimal “self ” as it appears in affective experience: Antonio Damasio’s neurobiological
concept of the “proto­‐self ” and Maurice Merleau­‐Ponty’s phenomenological account of the
minimal self.