Szczeliny determinacji

Filozoficzna polemika z Robertem M. Sapolskym

Abstract

The following article engages in a philosophical polemic with selected theses from the book Determined: The Science of Life Without Free Will by the eminent neurobiologist Robert M. Sapolsky. The aim of this text, though, is not to refute the hard determinism advocated by Sapolsky, but rather to problematise the cognitive horizon in which is the backdrop for his arguments for the nonexistence of free will. Therefore, the thesis I will formulate at the end of this discussion — as a form of opposition to Sapolsky’s claim that science has reliably and unequivocally proven the impossibility of the existence of free will — is not so much the statement that “free will exists” but rather the assertion that “the belief that science has already resolved the free will debate — thereby rendering it moot — is false”. In subsequent sections of the text, I analyse certain philosophical assumptions and conclusions that are central to the coherence of the argument presented in Determined. I begin by discussing Sapolsky’s understanding of the concept of free will and demonstrating that the meaning given to this term by the neuroscientist is de facto paradoxical. Next, I critically examine the concept of determination. I am primarily interested in whether its universal and widespread character truly opens the way to explaining all phenomena. Finally, in the last sections of the text, I will attempt to question the validity of the mechanical­‐reductive approach to explaining human activity.