Selfhood and autonomy from a dynamical perspective

Abstrakt

The paper begins by identifying several dimensions of selfhood that either appear contradictory or come across as requirements that no embodied being can possibly fulfil. Over against the tendencies to loosen the demands as far as autonomy and unity of self, I propose that the inherent tensions are negotiable provided that a dynamical organization of the developmental process is acknowledged. The latter becomes clear once we adopt the standpoint of the regulatory theory — the application of the principles of the dynamical system approach to the problems of human development (Schore, 1997). On this basis, I offer an outline of a cyclical (phasic) model of selfhood. The model operates on the assumption that we are intentional beings, and purports to show that each stage of intentional activity
creates problems only the next one can address. What the model tracks, essentially, are changes in affective (organismic) states associated with changes in the motivational system, beginning with its relatively random activation, through to the formation of explicit
intention, to the latter’s transformation through the integration of alternative perspectives, all the way up to reflective autonomy that defines boundary conditions for future pursuits.