Od Fichtego do Kanta i z powrotem. Kilka uwag o Marka J. Siemka idei transcendentalizmu

Autor

  • Wojciech Hanuszkiewicz

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.8.2.13

Słowa kluczowe:

Marek J. Siemek, Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, transcendentalism, transcendental genesis, intellectual intuition, apperception

Abstrakt

From Fichte to Kant and back. Several considerations on Marek J. Siemek’s concept of transcendentalism: The basic interpretation claim presented in Marek J. Siemek’s book is that Kant created a completely new level of philosophical reflection, for which the epistemological question remains characteristic. This question — in contrast to the epistemic questions posed before Kant — neither solely focuses on the problem of the ontic structure of the reality nor it does on the cognitive conditions which enable a subject to get to know the latter. The epistemological question deals with the very relationship that occurs between the cognition (subject) and the reality (object) and constitutes both the ontological and cognitive conditions of knowledge. According to Siemek, Kant developed a transcendental perspective, but only Fichte was able to fully develop it, while Kant dealt with interweaving epistemic and epistemological threads. However, one can defend the thesis that Kantian solutions, on the one hand, are much more strongly situated on the epistemological level of reflection than Siemek was ready to admit, and on the other hand, they offer a weaker (static) model of transcendentalism which — in contrast to the stronger (genetic) Fichte’s model — explores only the impassable limits of transcendental reflection.

Pobrania

Opublikowane

2018-12-01